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Moral Values in Moral Psychology?

A Textual Analysis

Shannon Starks

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Moral Values in Moral Psychology? A Textual Analysis

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What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like? While the value-free ideal of science requires at least the bracketing of values in regards to the conducting of research and influence on its results, this investigation takes seriously the concerns of leading social psychologists that biases may influence the subdiscipline. Textual analyses of moral psychology's literature involving content analysis of codes and cultural discourse analysis of value themes illuminate values involving moral problems and moral goods that may inherently influence research at various levels. It is proposed that values are impossible to eliminate from moral psychological research and that a simple epistemic/nonepistemic value distinction is inadequate for deciding which values are appropriate. A norm of value disclosure to replace the norm of the value-free ideal is recommended.

Keywords: moral psychology, value-free science, bias, content analysis, cultural discourse analysis, epistemic values, ontological dualism

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My mother, who listened to me and understood like nobody else even after her debilitating stroke, left us a year and a half ago, but she has been with me to the present moment, most remarkably in moments of crisis, and I am thankful.

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Moral Values in Moral Psychology?

A Textual Analysis

Leading social psychologists have expressed growing concern that political homogeneity in the subdiscipline may undermine scientific validity by embedding values in research questions and methods and mischaracterizing groups of people (Duarte et al., 2015). Methods to avert biases are part of every research program, but even so these researchers think a 10:1 ratio of liberals to conservatives is problematic for ideologically controversial subject matter—that is, issues on which there is disparate political disagreement. If their concerns are valid, the subfield of moral psychology—with subject matter close to the ideological fire—may be plagued by biases. The value-free ideal of science requires the bracketing of values to avoid biasing research, yet some scholars assert that value-free science is neither possible nor desirable (e.g., Brinkmann, 2005; Wylie & Nelson, 2007; Yanchar, Gantt, & Clay, 2005). While efforts have been made to distinguish “appropriate” values from others, theorists work have shown how even those values necessary to conduct science (epistemic values) can bias research outcomes (Slife & Williams, 1995).

Importantly, other scholars point to ideological controversies throughout the entire field of psychology, not only in moral or social psychology, and not only due to political homogeneity (e.g., Morss, 2013; Williams, 2001). For example, assumptions regarding what can be known have implications for what can exist, and in turn for how things *should* be, which is easily ideologically controversial (Couvalis, 1997). According to some psychotherapists, the value of individualism is a pervasive disciplinary moral outlook with notable ethical blind spots that trouble critics (Richardson, 2005, p. 26). In accordance with these scholars’ assertions, I argue

that values biasing moral psychology may represent a larger phenomenon characterizing the entire field.

Compounding this issue is the value-free ideal, itself a value. Routine checks thought to adequately expunge biases may hinder researchers and consumers of psychology's knowledge from examining inherent values (see Yanchar, Slife, & Warne, 2008). If value assumptions are inherent, acceptance of the value-free ideal does not afford researchers, students, or public consumers of psychology a truthful perspective of what findings mean—in short, it could be a form of deception, whether conscious or not. I attempt to illuminate this potential problem by investigating values in moral psychology.

I first summarize the evolution of the value-free ideal and discuss the epistemic-non-epistemic values distinction integral to the current value-free ideal. Second, I apply a theoretical discussion on the significance of values in science to psychology, and more particularly to moral psychology, attending to potential problems with the value-free ideal. In the third section I discuss how content and cultural discourse analyses are used to examine moral psychology's literature for potential values. In the fourth section I summarize major value themes to illuminate inherent values with important implications for informing decisions regarding moral debate and moral obligation. Especially if the concerns of Duarte et al. (2015) are valid, such a systematic investigation is overdue in moral psychology. In the fifth section I argue that in light of inherent values in moral psychology, the acknowledgment and disclosure of values is beneficial to the discipline. While this investigation does not exhaust the broad possibilities for dealing with values in moral psychology nor explicate details of a program of value disclosure, I argue that the value-free ideal is a detriment to the subdiscipline and value disclosure is a better alternative.

Value Ladenness and the Value Free Ideal

Theoretically informed scientists from diverse fields widely acknowledge that the traditional view of science as value free has been rationally and empirically refuted (e.g., Couvalis, 1997; Fleck, 1981; Kincaid, Dupré, & Wylie, 2007; Sampson, 1983; Slife & Williams, 1995), but there is wide disagreement about dealing with inherent values and preserving objectivity and the validity of science (Kincaid et al., 2007; Loughlin, 2008). Kuhn (1962) popularized the idea that epistemic values—those valued assumptions necessary for establishing sound and recognizable disciplinary standards for acquiring knowledge—inherently guide scientists' theory choices. Other researchers have noted that nonepistemic values—those not essential to science—are also inherently influential everywhere in the external parts of science (e.g., Nagel, 1961). Nonepistemic values guide research topic choices, yet they are necessary for beginning a study. However, nonepistemic values are thought inappropriate as influencers of reasoning or evidence in the internal parts of scientific endeavors. Hence, the prevailing value-free ideal does not mean science has *no* values, but that the internal stages of science are free of nonepistemic values (Douglas, 2007).

While epistemic values are presented as unquestionable scientific assumptions in psychology's introductory texts (e.g., valuing sensory observation and replication), many psychologists would argue that nonepistemic values do not inhere in science itself and must be limited as to where they are allowed to influence science (Haack, 1993; Howard, 1985; Koertge, 2003). For example, the social and moral consequences of research (nonepistemic values) should not be allowed to interfere with “the intellectual content of either the problems scientists address or the answers they explore” (Koertge, 2003, p. 225). As one philosopher of science notes, “discomfort at a belief's consequences cannot be invoked to refute it” (Ross, 2007, p. 2). The

biases that students of psychology's methods are instructed to avoid (e.g., experimenter's bias in which a psychologist's expectations influence how data are interpreted; sponsor effects thought to plague a high percentage of pharmaceutical studies [Freemantle, 2000]) are considered nonepistemic.

This epistemic/nonepistemic distinction guides the current conceptualization of a bias-free science (e.g., Howard, 1985), yet scholars point to its inadequacy to guide value standards in science (Wylie & Nelson, 2007). Competition between epistemic values is inevitable as one value takes precedence over another. While many researchers would consider their value of observable and replicable events over nonobservable and nonreplicable events as essential to good science, other scholars argue that a standard of valuing observation and replication over other important methods of systematic inquiry hinders and distorts understanding of truth and knowledge in psychological science (see Slife, Reber, & Richardson, 2009). If, as Ioannidis asserts (2012, p. 652), "the pursuit of truth remains our main goal in our work as scientists," I argue that other so-called epistemic values may interfere.

Further, I maintain that values guiding researcher attention toward one factor over others inevitably involve subjective preferences with influence well beyond choosing a study topic (Kincaid et al., 2007). Fleck (1981) demonstrated how a trained scientist's attention is not governed by objective properties of the subject matter but instead by the complex social conditions of training and practice—the resulting body of knowledge could hardly be free of nonepistemic values. Rorty (1985) has claimed that truth itself emerges directly from contextual social values, in which case epistemic values would easily assume moral content.

Researching the existing body of knowledge in the psychological literature to frame one's study may be considered epistemic—a necessary part of standard disciplinary practice. Yet the

entire body of literature is shaped by multiple psychologists making nonepistemic-value decisions about what is worth studying. These decisions would inevitably be influenced by social considerations beyond established disciplinary standards (e.g., Kincaid et. al, 2007, p. 9).

Finally, I view the difference between epistemic and nonepistemic values as ambiguous. If valuing social and moral consequences is nonepistemic, then it seems that *not* valuing social and moral consequences would also be a nonepistemic value. While some scholars value value freedom, others value the social and moral responsibility of scientific research (e.g., Douglas, 2007; see also Teo, 2015). While one value will hold sway over the other, neither would seem more or less inherent or necessary to a program of study than the other.

Given that rival epistemic values require nonepistemic choices, epistemic values themselves emerge from social values, and the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values is ambiguous, I would argue that the distinction is inadequate to guide value standards in science. Fortunately, scholars have provided other ideas for discerning and evaluating values and their potential impact.

The Significance of Values in Science

Kincaid et al. (2007, p. 10), offer three other dimensions on which to discern inherent and implicit values in science—how they are involved, where they are involved, and what effect they have. The first refers to whether values are inevitable or merely possible and whether values are implied by findings or implicitly presupposed, influencing research design itself. The second concerns where in research values are involved—externally (e.g., influencing choice of topics) or internally (e.g., influencing measures). The third, the effect of values, is possibly the most important and yet the most difficult to investigate.

How are values involved in science? If values are not inevitable but merely possible, they could be expunged. However, if they are inevitable, efforts to expunge them would be fruitless. Values that are merely implied by findings would not compromise the value-free ideal. On the other hand, implicitly presupposed values may have an impact on research outcomes, which has implications for the objectivity of scientific reason and evidence.

Illustrating this first dimension, an immunologist explains how values were inevitable and implicitly presupposed in his personal experience with experimental science:

[S]tudents are told that one of the most important properties for a scientist to develop is an uncompromising scrutiny of all observations and opinions encountered in the professional context . . . guided by pure logical reasoning. In reality, scientific education is quite different. A young scientist is trained to believe in . . . a host of information which is impossible to question by logic or to otherwise critically evaluate. . . . That a competing notion may be equally well supported by evidence is either unconsciously ignored or actively suppressed (Eichmann, 2008, p. 210).

Eichmann's (2008) experience may illustrate what Duarte et al. (2015) call a "cohesive moral community [with a] shared reality [that] blinds its members [to] ideologically undesirable hypotheses and unanswered but important scientific questions" (p. 8). These social psychologists point to problematic examples of "value statements wrongly treated as objective truth" (p. 8), such as measures that ask questions with embedded liberal values. Though the researchers consider such values unscientific and recommend ways to curb them, Eichmann's experience suggests what novice scientists are taught is implicitly value laden from the beginning. It also illustrates the inevitability of accepting one presupposed notion over competing others, some of which may be equally well supported. While the self-correcting nature of science allows such

values and the notions they support to change, needed change requires considerable struggle in an environment in which it is impossible to question or critically evaluate cherished values and notions. This would have implications for moral psychology's research outcomes.

Where are values found in science? If values are inevitable and implicitly presupposed, in which aspects of research are they involved? Duarte et al. (2015) are concerned about selection of research topics as a major risk to scientific validity in a politically one-sided discipline because researchers may focus on areas that validate their political leanings. But if value-laden selection of research topics is risky, how much more is validity threatened by values that determine evidence of confirmation, such as value-laden research measures? Eichmann (2008, p. 34) describes how persuasion and experience teach scientists to expect certain outcomes, resulting in a circular relationship between procedure and results. Accordingly, the values influencing the outcomes of science may be so buried in tradition as to render them invisible.

Couvalis (1997) notes how such influence reaches to the deepest levels of research: the acceptable range of scientific explanations are delimited by important *metaphysical* assumptions, ideas about what can exist—values, inasmuch as they are preferred over other viable and equally well supported assumptions. These valued assumptions are not generally explicit but are rather manifested implicitly in the ways scientists explain and conduct their science (p. 91). Such presuppositions and their implications may not become apparent without studied efforts at discerning them, and so in this investigation I pay attention to the possibility of their influencing both selection of study topics and outcomes of moral psychology research.

What effects do values have in science? Duarte et al. (2015) criticize the influence of politically one-sided subjective values on research outcomes as a threat to objectivity, such as in

the mischaracterizing of people within their political affiliations. But scholars argue that *not all* subjective values influencing the outcomes of research threaten the validity of science. In fact, some assert that subjective values, even in the internal parts of science, may serve to make science valid (e.g., Nozick, 1998). Root (2007) maintains that science is inevitably value laden, and science constrained by value-free idealism is neither socially relevant nor value free. Further, Wylie and Nelson (2007) maintain that value-free idealism may *hinder* scientific objectivity by restraining consideration of important perspectives. Finally, Douglas (2007) argues for an ethical science: no scientist in any part of science is exempt from considering the potential consequences of research, as is born out by the widely accepted valuing of human rights in research practices, even at the sacrifice of knowledge.

In accordance with these ideas, I assert that scientists are no more able than anyone else to avoid taking a moral stance, and further, that the “basic norms of moral responsibility and the reasoning needed to do sound, acceptable science” entail a rejection of the value-free ideal (Douglas, 2007, p. 135). Instead, I argue, examination of values, including the value-free ideal is requisite. While I do not attempt to demonstrate the effects of values these scholars have discussed, I hope my examination of values in moral psychology reveals the pervasiveness of inherent and implicitly presupposed values, illuminating potential effects to inform an ongoing dialogue about how to deal with these issues.

Value Ladenness in Psychological Science

Historian of psychology Daniel Robinson (1985) has warned that assuming a scientific value-free ideal in psychology could result in “fatally defective” assumptions about human nature (p. 2). While scholars disagree about the proper role of values in psychology (see Tjeltveit, 2015), many agree that psychology is value laden. For example, Danziger (1997) argues that

psychological categories accepted as objective and universal are culturally motivated rather than “natural.” These scholars are concerned about the impact of such values, which are not generally given attention in psychological science. The following section considers inherent value ladenness in psychological science framed by the three dimensions discussed above (see Kincaid et al., 2007).

How values are involved in psychological science: Inevitable and implicit? Though Duarte et al. (2015) suggest valid ways to avoid embedded values and mischaracterizations of groups in social psychology, other scholars would assert that values will influence research in spite of such efforts. May (1967) argued that as a scientist, “you see what your microscope or telescope is focused to take in” (p. 90). Sampson (1983) claims that psychology’s ideas about justice developed as ideological notions about what *should* be, with values built in from the outset, suggesting that in all aspects of psychological science, the questions asked, approaches employed, and even what constitutes an acceptable answer “reflect something more extensive than purely scientific curiosity and disinterested neutrality” (p. 4). These psychologists note implicit values at every level of research—selecting and defining a subject, designing methods, and explaining the way things are—even intimating the way things *should be*. If they are right, the effects of inherent values on researchers and consumers of psychology’s knowledge could render value examination critical.

While it appears that values are impossible to expunge, it may be possible to exchange or rearrange them if such action were deemed appropriate. Duarte et al.’s (2015) recommendations to increase political diversity in social psychology suggest something like this—a balancing of values rather than their removal. Still, the researchers assume a clear distinction between “descriptive fact[s]” and “philosophical/ideological” ideas (p. 11) as if the truth psychology’s

research produces should inhabit a separate realm from the ideological—in other words, it should be value free. Inasmuch as values in moral psychology are cloaked by this value-free ideal, such implicitly presupposed values would be less accessible for examination or rearranging.

Where values are involved in psychological science. Morss (2013) argues that the Western values of positivism, naturalism, and functionalism have a major impact on every aspect of developmental psychology, focusing the proverbial microscope on presumably progressive changes to the disregard of meanings and ways of being that do not fit the accepted concept of “healthy” development. Other psychologists have observed that the value of materialism increasingly influences psychology so that at every level the discipline is “biologized” (e.g., Slife, 2004; Williams, 2001). Materialism leads logically to the adoption of material treatments—for example, focusing on neurobiological functioning and depression correlates at the expense of traditional psychological diagnoses results in an emphasis on pharmacological interventions at the expense of traditional psychological treatments (Hedges & Burchfield, 2009, p. 99). So entrenched is this value that though serious limitations frequently plague double-blind, randomized clinical trials (e.g., “the study sponsor is the strongest predictor of antidepressant efficacy”, p. 113), there has been no consequential questioning of the efficacy of pharmacological treatments for depression.

If these scholars’ arguments manifest “ideological claims . . . wrongly treated as objective truth” (Duarte et al., 2015, p. 9), they suggest that psychological science may be inherently laden with implicit values at every level—in selecting and defining an area of study, designing study methods, and explaining the way things are.

The effects of values in psychological science. Implications for the potential effects of values may be categorized into three main areas: 1) values as problematic, 2) values as necessary to good psychological science, and 3) effects of the value-free ideal.

Problems with values in psychological science. While Duarte et al. (2015) point to potential validity problems created by embedded liberal values due to political one-sidedness in social psychology, other critics are concerned about values that pervade psychology due to ideological assumptions embedded still more deeply in the wider culture (e.g., Slife, 2004). For example, Slife notes problems with hedonism, which posits that the purpose of all behavior is fundamentally to increase personal pleasure and avoid pain. This favored explanation coheres with Western values including the prevailing version of natural selection, but since hedonism does not account for exceptions, researchers must explain away altruistic behavior to fit hedonic principles or as flukes. Scholars note that professional practice and the experiences of many therapists and clients are at odds with the very theory that underlies mainstream treatment plans. If a therapist can only serve a client inasmuch as the service brings commensurate self-benefit, at the very least the purpose of therapy and APA ethical principles (APA, 2010) are confounded (Slife, 2004).

Values essential for good psychological science. A few theorists argue that though values may be problematic, they are also necessary for good psychological science to proceed inasmuch as they make science relevant. Teo (2015) asserts that psychology needs strong moral values to guide disciplinary practices and ensure that important values do not easily give way to more transient or trivial values of an irresponsible individual or group. Where trivial values take precedence, missing perspectives are more likely to be masked, leaving groups of people

vulnerable to marginalization. Disciplinary values in this sense act to guard against incidental and undue involvement of the *wrong* values.

Slife, Reber, and Faulconer (2012) claim that good research requires examined and explicit contextual values so that researchers know what should take precedence and consumers of psychology know what researchers consider important. These scholars argue that unexamined and decontextualized values prevailing in psychology's research lead to theoretical inconsistencies and misunderstandings because different kinds of research require different priorities in values. For example, while it may be apparent that therapists value helping clients to be mentally healthy, this term could have diverse subcultural value-meanings that should be made clear to researchers, therapists, clients, and other consumers. Though increasing political diversity in the discipline may be commensurate with more politically balanced views (Duarte et al., 2015), arguably even if political views could be balanced, this would not adequately clarify deeply embedded cultural values so that researchers, therapists, clients, and other consumers could perceive them and make informed decisions.

Problems with the claim of value-freedom. Because the value-free ideal is implicated in cloaking these values, its potential problems are considered specifically. The claims of its critics often fall into three general areas: 1) limits the value-free ideal imposes on science, 2) imposition of Western values on other cultures in the guise of value-free objectivity, and 3) self-fulfilling circularity of misguided science sustained by people acting out what they perceive to be value-free truth.

Limiting science. Yanchar and Slife (1997) argue that psychology's failure to examine presupposed values confines it to a narrow view of the world that precludes alternative views. Danziger (1997, p. 191) notes the impermeability of psychology's prevailing culturally grounded

prescriptive social discourse: “Except on a very superficial level, . . . no knowledge with revolutionary implications could possibly emerge from [investigations].” Cushman (1995) asserts that psychotherapists unintentionally perpetuate the idea that psychology’s prescriptions reflect natural facts—the way a person should be. Viewing these established concepts as value free renders other possibilities essentially beyond reach. Thus, the value-free ideal may impose important and potentially damaging limitations on disciplinary practices.

Imposing Western values. Notwithstanding limitations, Cushman (1995) suggests that inasmuch as “psychology is one of the guilds most responsible for determining the proper way of being human, [it] wields a significant amount of power” (p. 336). Many psychologists have observed that exporting Western psychology’s prescriptive approach as objective and value free is a form of cultural imperialism (e.g., Christopher, 2005; Dueck, Ting, & Cutiongco, 2007; Slife & Reber, 2009; Stam, 2015). Christopher, Wendt, Marecek, and Goodman (2014) report that without a cultural understanding of psychology, U.S. psychologists who attempted to provide support in Sri Lanka following the 2004 tsunami violated important cultural norms by unwittingly exporting Western values in the guise of value-free objectivity. Morss (2013) argues that such socio-political imperialism has a notable impact on people’s lives and hopes (pp. 4-7) as it “violently suppress[es] alternative ways of thinking and of being” (p. 51).

Self-fulfilling prophecies. According to Cushman (1995, p. 7), presenting these ideas as value free in Western and nonwestern cultures alike contributes to potentially harmful self-fulfilling circularity in which theories “inevitably reproduce the very cause of the ills they treat,” which would violate APA ethical principles (APA, 2010). Richards (2002, p. 9) illustrates this reflexive character of psychology: “[N]obody prior to Freud had an Oedipus complex [and] nobody before about 1914 had a ‘high IQ.’” The practices of the discipline and consequential

public response make such concepts real. Dupré (2001) notes that scientists and journalists alike confidently take advantage of the public conception that “any question that can be answered at all can best be answered by science” (p. 2), though disseminated explanations of human behavior are far from value free.

Conclusion. These scholars’ ideas suggest that the value-free ideal is at least as great a concern as other values involved in psychological science and point to the continued failure of the discipline to examine or address its implications. This attempt to examine inherent and implicit values—including the value-free ideal—in moral psychology, is an effort to illuminate such implications.

Value Ladenness in Moral Psychology

While some view proper psychological science as being aloof from values and criticize psychologists’ efforts to derive “ought” from “is” (e.g., Kendler, 2002), others see values as inherent (e.g., Brinkmann, 2005). Haidt (2012) illustrates how moral psychology grew up based on two basic valued and largely unquestioned assumptions: good moral reasoning is the product of progressively higher levels of rational thinking, and morality is fundamentally about harm and fairness. Where the assumptions of this “liberal ideal” have prevailed, researchers have indeed found what they were trained to find. Haidt (2012) explains, “[B]y using a framework that predefined morality as justice while denigrating authority, hierarchy, and tradition, it was inevitable that the research would support worldviews that were secular, questioning, and egalitarian” (p . 10).

As those traditional ideas have not accounted for important political divisiveness in the West nor global moral behaviors, researchers have taken note of presumptions behind those theories. If “careful and honest scientific research” (Haidt, 2012, p. 10) produces findings that

inevitably support valued presumptions, it seems antithetical to claim that a value-free ideal sets such research apart from contemporary philosophical, political, or religious discourse. On the contrary, it seems that scientific research may be implicitly every bit as value laden, and dangerously so when it is put forth as value free. The assumption of value-free moral psychology may entrench such presumptions so they are largely ignored.

The value-free ideal in moral psychology . Kendler (2002) draws a sharp distinction between fact and value, noting that “[s]peculations are free but facts are sacred” (p. 9). He rejects the notion that psychology can reveal moral principles of human conduct (p. 32), though it can *inform* moral policy with reliable information that meets “a more demanding standard of rationality” (p. 6). However, critics assert that the value-free ideal behind this distinction is itself part of a biased philosophy and that in adopting it psychology preemptively biases investigations against certain defensible positions, including theistic ones (Richardson, 2006; Slife & Reber, 2009), much as the implicit assumptions of the liberal ideal discussed above may have biased research outcomes to support the assumptions themselves. Further, Williams (2005) asserts that epistemological constraints have rendered psychology ineffective in its attempts to address matters that matter most in psychology. Moral psychology’s attempts to address these matters may be hindered by a value-free ideal that positions presupposed values as the incontrovertible method for discovering anything that can be known.

Social psychologists concerned about biases that inevitably filter into research due to political one-sidedness advocate political balancing to correct potential problems (see Duarte et al, 2015). This desire for such diversity reflects valuing “enhanced creativity, discovery, and problem solving” (p. 1). It is based on the presupposition that multiple views cancel out distal views and eventually “converge upon the truth” (p. 5). In moral psychology and elsewhere in the

discipline, presupposed values appear to be always operating undercover in disciplinary knowledge that purports to be value free. Some values may make good sense, while others may not—a good reason to disclose and examine them rather than to claim that good moral psychology is value free.

Problematic presuppositions, moral psychology, and the value-free ideal. Sonuga-Barke (2011) cautions developmental psychologists about implicitly assuming what is the right way to be a human—for example, what is normal, abnormal, or mature. Increasing independence may be viewed as appropriate in one culture, while ultimate submission to divine authority may be viewed as appropriate in another. He warns that “what is merely assumed to be the case becomes presented as self-evidently true” (p. 2), admonishing researchers to examine their values and readers to read between the lines in order to detect such values and their implications. Yet valuing such value-disclosure in moral psychology seems to take a backseat to valuing value-freedom.

Nelson and Slife (2012) describe “deep philosophical difficulties” derived from disciplinary presuppositions, which are rarely assumed to be values, but are instead assumed to define science. These psychologists outline some of the problems with methodological value presuppositions, such as operationalism, lawfulness, and reductionism. The authors assert that operationalizing all behavior results in data that are often far removed from the actual phenomenon being studied. Lawfulness excludes anomalies perhaps vital to understanding the moral implications of religion and spirituality, and reductionism grounds behavior in lower-level processes ultimately ending in molecular biology. Each of these presuppositions from the outset excludes God as relevant to human morality and misses important complexities of the human

mind and social organizations, and each is presumed to cohere with the idea of a value-free psychological science.

A study of implicit attitudes illustrates potential implications for moral psychology of inherent disciplinary biases. Reber, Slife, and Downs (2012) found that theistically oriented, university educated students of psychology moved away from their theistic beliefs as they spent more time in their program. Students had replaced their original implicit theistic biases with implicit naturalistic biases—perhaps assuming them to be value free and objective, or at least less biased and closer to the truth. The findings of these scholars give reason to examine values in moral psychology.

The present study. Inasmuch as moral psychology purports to supply value-free knowledge to inform the world’s moral debates and moral obligations, the value-laden ideals of a “professional subculture” (Danziger, 1997, p. 5) may be sanctioned as unbiased and objective knowledge, thus obscuring inherent values and their effects. Haidt (2012) shows how political biases may easily be embedded in moral psychology. But in spite of scholarly concerns about biases in psychology, systematic investigation of potential implicit values is lacking. Does research in moral psychology present value-laden findings as if they were objective and value free? I attempt to systematically address the question and to illuminate shared implicit values that may have an impact on a litany of concerns of the scholars cited above: limits on what can exist and what can be known, theoretical consistency, social relevance, prescriptions for right ways of being human and the imposition of Western values on other cultures, felt moral obligations, and self-fulfilling circularity. Each of these scholarly concerns relates to efforts toward an objective understanding of human nature and an objective understanding of what can be done regarding such nature.

This study inherently reflects my values as the primary researcher, inseparable from the context of my mentors and other life experiences. My concerns include authoritative institutions presenting as definitive scientific findings based on notions of a “fictional nature” (Eichman, 2019, p. 209), censure by the discipline of psychology of specific alternate views, and the tacit and untenable foreclosure of genuine human purpose in psychology’s explanations. While I find much in moral psychology’s reports to reflect my own values, they are not the values of all people, and exporting these findings as natural scientific truth is unjustified and potentially dangerous. I argue that such practices could unravel much of the good that science, including psychology, has done in the modern world.

I argue that moral values are inherent in the practices of moral psychology as well as in all of science—that one can never escape one’s values. However, the impact of values inherent in psychological science may be of critical importance where the subject matter is both relational and agentic. For this reason, I hope the discipline of psychology, which has the potential to do a great deal of good as well as a great deal of damage, will engage in continuing fruitful discourse about its assumptions and the values it cannot escape.

Based on my understanding of these concerns, I have asked two salient questions: “What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like?” and “Does moral psychology promote values as if they were objective and value free?” In the next section I describe my own value-laden cultural discourse analysis of moral psychology’s literature. I hope that this research will call disciplinary attention to implicit values and their implications, including problems with the value-free ideal, and consequently promote an ongoing dialogue to address value scrutiny and disclosure as an alternative.

Method

In this section I describe my efforts at a systematic cultural discourse analysis of implicit values in 25 highly cited moral psychology research articles (see Quinn, 2005). Content analysis was also employed to analyze the distribution of implicit values (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). Discourse analysis and content analysis have long traditions of applying systematic scientific rigor to analyzing textual data (e.g., Bernard & Ryan, 2010; Wertz et. al, 2011).

In this attempt, my understanding of values in the cultural discourse of moral psychology is inherently influenced by my assumptions that humans are fundamentally relational and divinely purposed agents. Just as the discourse of moral psychology is inseparable from the values of its creators, this discourse is inherently influenced by the values of its researcher and coders.

Cultural Discourse Analysis of Highly Cited Articles

Since psychology's scientific community can be viewed as belonging to a culture with shared meanings, many of which may be implicit, cultural discourse analysis seemed an appropriate method for getting at the shared values of moral psychology. This analysis derived meanings from moral psychology's literature through multiple examinations, beginning with a list of themes derived from the literature review to guide codebook development. These initial themes did not so much reflect values themselves as how and where to find values. This project is not a literature review, as my research aim was to analyze the cultural discourse carefully crafted to please editors and leaders in the discipline in order to illuminate the meanings of potential biases. I attempt to reconstruct tacit value assumptions from the raw data of disciplinary reports—in other words, I seek to understand what, for the psychologists who write these reports, is the right way to think about and understand people.

Content Analysis

Content analysis involved analyzing each paragraph as a unit for the presence of each value in the code system derived through the preliminary analysis (see Bernard & Ryan, 2010, pp. 287-310). A member of the research team experienced in cultural discourse analysis and content analysis provided initial training, and the primary researcher trained a second coder. The development of the code system is described below. Interrater reliability was established by Cohen's kappa.

Highly Cited Articles in Moral Psychology

Since I wanted this analysis to reflect what is widely accepted at the center of moral psychology, the selection process favored the most highly cited empirical research. Selection began with a PsychINFO journal search consisting of "moral*" in the title OR in the abstract, using limiters peer-reviewed and years 2005-2015. Limiting by publication showed which psychology journals focusing on empirical articles produced the most search hits for the above criteria, and the top five were selected (number of hits in parentheses): *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* (99), *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (73), *Psychological Science* (59), *Personality and Individual Differences* (59), and *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* (57).

A Web of Science search followed, first using criteria "moral*" in the title OR as an author identifier with the same year limiter 2005-2015. This search was refined by the source titles listed above. I then selected "create citation report," saved the top 100 records to an Excel file, and sorted by average number of citations per year. I selected the top 30 after removing duplicate authors. The top 25 of these articles comprise the raw data of analysis (see Table 1).

The bottom five articles provided material for coding practice and example passages for the final codebook. Researchers used the software, MAXQDA, to aid in coding and analysis.

Developing a Codebook and Coding Data

Initial coding for implicit values was informed by two main theoretical ideas drawn from the literature review: 1) The inevitability and implicitness of values, and 2) The value of value freedom. They are briefly explained here.

Inevitability and implicitness of values. Though researchers are taught to explain and justify their methods, some values may be hidden because they belong to value systems assumed to be the way things are. Even when justification is provided for specific practices, hidden values may lurk under the justification itself. Uncovering implicit “shoulds” illuminates hidden values and helps in discerning whether they are inevitable and implicitly presupposed. For example, why *should* anyone do a particular study? Implicit “shoulds” may emerge in at least these areas: 1) motives for research, 2) motives for methods, 3) ideal or preferred ways of being human, and 4) values manifested in interpretation of data.

The value of value-freedom. Since the value-free ideal is widely valued in psychology, its importance as a value warrants disciplinary attention. It is also likely to be assumed, tacit, and unquestioned. Keywords and phrases (e.g., objective, scientific, bias), justifications of scientific validity, and authoritative universal pronouncements may manifest the value-free ideal.

Evolution of codebook. The above ideas guided a search for values from which to develop an initial taxonomy of value themes. I scrutinized the seven most highly cited articles several times for value meanings in metaphors, keywords, ideas, and ways of reasoning. For example, “harm” was a theme that emerged in examining motives for research, as all of the articles manifested an implicit idea of hope to diminish some kind of harm to humans. Each

examination informed ongoing changes to the codebook, which included coding aids such as inclusion and exclusion criteria for each theme (Table 2).

Two researchers examined the initial codebook and the sample articles for consistency of meanings and thoroughness, adjusting codes and criteria as needed. Further iterations continued, with researchers consulting until codes consistently reflected the data. After several codebook revisions it became apparent that the codebook needed to include codes that contrasted with the dominant codes in order to provide critical comparisons to aid in discerning implicit values (see Slife et al., 2009). This iterative process continued and included recording memos—ideas, thoughts, and impressions—to help with and explain coding decisions.

Final codebook and data analysis. The final codebook included 11 dominant codes and 11 alternate codes representing three major categories: value-free science (e.g., dualism, universality), understanding morality (e.g., mechanistic morality, natural rationality), and good vs. bad (natural harm, better world; see Table 2). Coding involved several training sessions as well as independent coding practice on the last five articles from the list. This codebook included example passages, search keywords, lists of related codes, and example rationales to help with coding. When a level of consistency was achieved between coders, the first coder analyzed the first 25 articles using the final codebook. The second coder randomly selected five of those articles and independently followed the same process. The first coder's data were used in the cultural discourse analysis. This analysis provided insight into the distribution of cultural values shared across authors of moral psychology's reports (see Quinn, 2005, p. 47).

Analysis and Results

In this project I address two broad questions: “What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like?” and “Does moral psychology promote

values as if they were objective and value free?" This involved analyzing each paragraph as a unit, using the developed codebook for content analysis, as well as cultural discourse analysis of value themes in the texts. The latter analysis first discusses manifestations of value-free science in terms of ontological dualism. It next discusses other values in terms of moral problems and moral goods, pointing to summary tables to help provide a broader picture of how these value themes are manifested in moral psychology's research reports.

Content Analysis of Codes

Since codes were overlapping rather than mutually exclusive, interrater reliability for dominant codes was established individually by Cohen's kappa. These kappas and their means across articles appear in Table 3. Because alternate codes had few hits and almost no agreement, there was no appropriate statistical test for analyzing them. Statistical analysis of dominant codes yielded an overall interrater reliability of 0.3032. Readers should be aware that the highest agreement between coders often results in the lowest kappa values, due to the high percentage of appearance of these codes in the reports (e.g., Universality, Dualism) and the fact that this greatly increases the probability used to assess Cohen's kappa.

Since many of the codes are largely implicit, it is difficult to establish precise locations for their appearance in the articles. Interrater reliability based on a paragraph as a unit of analysis may not be the best reflection of agreement. Both coders found most of the dominant codes in all of the articles, a summary of which can be seen in Table 3. Table 4 summarizes frequency for the first coder's data, and details of the content analysis are found in Table 5.

Unused codes. Alternate codes were added to help in discerning implicit values (see Slife et al., 2009), not because these categories were found in the texts when developing the codebook. Some of these contrasting codes were found occasionally during the coding process,

but a few were not. “Holism,” which assumes the impossibility of objectivity independent of subjectivity, was not found. “Understanding,” here meaning independent from prediction, was not found in that all reports manifested the idea that prediction was a necessary component of understanding morality. “Contextuality,” referring to non-universal and possibly nonrecurring particulars, was also not found in that all reports manifested the aim to discover universally applicable principles governing moral behaviors and judgments. Finally, “Intentional types,” the idea that the delineation of types inherently involves genuine intentions, was not found.

Alternate codes and coding discrepancies. Coding of alternate codes resulted in the greatest discrepancies (see Table 5). The second coder thought Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005) manifested “Aloofness,” or a lack of values other than scientific curiosity, in 30 paragraphs. This code was juxtaposed against the code “Better World,” which was applied to researchers’ values about what humans should or should not be like—in other words what they would be like in a better world. In the codebook, exclusion criteria for “Aloofness” states, “Attempts to manifest aloof scientific curiosity when anything in the article implies a better or worse way of being human.” Given that the researchers manifest strong concerns about “deep moral cleavages” and lack of cooperation, the second coder did not code these paragraphs as “Aloofness.”

Similarly, the second coder coded Gray and Wegner’s (2009) caution against unwarranted generalization of their findings and Skitka et al.’s (2005) recognition of differing moral convictions with “Situated rationality,” which refers to thinking and behavior inextricable from genuine contextual meaning. This coder also viewed passages about differing moral convictions to reflect “Meaningful morality” rather than “Mechanistic morality.” The first coder viewed the caution to mean that more scientific research is needed before universal principles

can be clearly understood and references to differing convictions to reflect a lawful (natural) view of rationality based on efficient causal mechanisms, since the researchers manifest in their report a mechanistic view of morality. In the same vein, the second coder coded 14 paragraphs in Skitka et al. (2005) as “Cultural harm,” as they reflect differing views of harm. I view these passages to reflect researchers’ acknowledgement that subjective views differ and the simultaneous assertion that “really real” harm has universal status (Shweder, 1991, p. 64). According to the codebook, “Cultural Harm” applies when “what counts as harmful or not harmful is inextricable from cultural values and meanings.” Discrepancies may reflect the need for codebook clarification or ambiguity of values in the reports themselves.

Cultural Discourse Analysis of Value Themes

Routine reading of these reports is unlikely to draw out the nuances of implicit meanings and potential value themes. Though the content analysis shows a distribution of potential values, it does not capture the meanings of more specific value themes. Guided by the coding, the primary researcher scrutinized the texts for these specific value themes (see Quinn, 2005, p. 47). Under the value-free science category, the dominant codes are manifested in abundance in every article, and most are widely recognized in moral psychology as scientific protocol. The value meanings involved in these codes are manifested in the other major categories of the codebook—in the ways researchers understand morality and what people should be like. To avoid a great deal of redundancy, my report of my cultural discourse analysis does not discuss specifically the value-free science codes except for “Dualism.” This code requires explication because it is rarely recognized or acknowledged, and it is ideal for showing the prevalence of the value-free ideal and answering the question of how best to obtain disciplinary knowledge. Since most passages of

text were assigned multiple codes and there is substantial overlap between code meanings, most value themes do not match individual codes.

The codes represent general values found in the preliminary search. When all the texts were coded, there were more than 10,000 coded passages. To get at the moral value themes potentially involved in the cultural discourse of moral psychology, passages for each code were scrutinized separately, and specific value themes emerged (see Table 6 for a sample of major themes). For example, within passages coded “Harm,” specific kinds of moral evils and moral goods became apparent. Moral problems and goods appeared under every code, and these were categorized into subthemes. To keep track of these emerging themes, I created summary tables including relevant passages with citations. This was an ongoing iterative process as each passage was scrutinized, and some tables are highly redundant. Those included in this report highlight the themes I thought were most salient in representing how moral psychologists understand morality and what they think humans should be like. My values are reflected in decisions about how to categorize within larger themes and decisions regarding which implications are included.

Value-free science. Most who consider the codes under value-free science to be values would consider them to be epistemic—scientific protocol for producing value-free science. But dualism is rarely recognized or acknowledged, and it well represents value-free science in this analysis. Ontological dualism assumes two independent realities in which an objective realm exists completely free of influences from the other subjective realm (Slife et al., 2012, p. 726). The two interact, such as when subjective meaning is assigned to objective reality, but they remain fundamentally separate (p. 728). Each article manifests objective/subjective dualism in at least implying that human moral understanding, reasoning, and judgments are subjective and biased, while at the same time presenting findings about moral understanding, reasoning, and

judgments as value-free scientific knowledge—as if value-free methods effectively expunged researchers’ biases (see Table 7). Results “demonstrate” the validity of principles and “reveal” reality, while people “construe” and have “notions.” Even though some researchers acknowledge their findings as tentative, this is not an admission of inherent values but rather a suggestion that further value-free data will eventually clarify and refine objective principles.

For example, Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008) report, “activating intuitions about cleanliness” reduces “moral condemnation” (p. 1222). The moral condemnation people engage in is clearly biased and belongs to the subjective realm, but the researchers assert that moral condemnation is reduced by environmental cues as if this were a fact—a value-free concept. The meaning of “condemnation” and the desire to demonstrate the irrationality of moral judgments are ostensibly freed from human subjectivity by value-free methods.

Similarly, Helzer and Pizarro (2011) provide objective “evidence” of subjective “hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior stemming from irrelevant cues (p. 517). Researchers’ values, which would be inherent in the meaning of “hypervigilant,” are supposedly expunged from the “evidence,” as is the researchers’ motivation to demonstrate the unwarranted nature of such judgments. In another example of ontological dualism, Gray and Wegner (2009) assert that “in the mind of the perceiver” (p. 507), moral victims and moral benefactors are inversely conceptualized. The demonstration of this objective and universal principle via value-free methods is supposedly undistorted by any subjective values in the mind of the researcher.

Such ontological dualism reflects the belief that moral psychology produces value-free, and therefore unbiased and valid, knowledge—in direct opposition to judgments resulting from subjective beliefs. Checks for biases, replication, random assignment, and control groups are among the methods these researchers use to ensure that subjectivity does not influence their data.

Whether or not ontological dualism is acknowledged, it is a dominant manifestation of the value-free ideal in moral psychology (see Slife et al., 2012, p. 740).

Moral problems and moral goods. Important value themes emerging from this analysis fall under the umbrella of how morality should be understood and what humans should be like. Tables 8-10 highlight themes that specifically concern moral problems and imply moral goods. Since most researchers articulate specific real world problems but only imply their own concern about them and some researchers scrupulously avoid value-laden language, their concerns and values must be inferred. The descriptions in this section are meant to elucidate the reasons I think these problems reflect researchers' concerns and values. One manifestation of such implicit values is researchers' suggestions for alleviating moral problems. Table 8 summarizes moral problems and researchers' suggestions for alleviating them. Table 9 specifies for each article researchers' implied ideas of what counts and *does not* count as "Harm," which may have salient implications for the value-free ideal in moral psychology. Table 10 summarizes clashing moral views between liberals and conservatives, a prevalent issue in many of these reports. The themes highlighted here involve important *shoulds* about life, death, and social costs—not merely problems, but *moral* problems.

Since virtually all of these moral problems and moral goods involve relationships, and virtually all of the affirmed sources of these problems and goods are ultimately mechanistic, they are discussed here under two nonexclusive general themes: problems with relationships and problems based in mechanistic morality.

Relational problems and goods. Nonexclusive themes addressed under relational issues include inequality, harsh judgment, dishonesty, intentional harm, and clashing moral views.

Inequality. At least half of the articles mention or elucidate social problems associated with inequality, and the terms used in these reports indicate that inequality is viewed as a social problem with moral implications. Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, and Chen (2007) raise “an important social psychological question: Why do so many people tolerate—and even celebrate—a system that benefits relatively few at the expense of the majority” (p. 267)? This question is important not only because “people are psychologically distressed by the presence of unjustified inequality” (p. 267), but because benefitting a few at the expense of many is a social evil about which these researchers care deeply. Their studies concern how “the privileged minority find ways of relieving their consciences and seeing their privileges as fully legitimate” (p. 267), implying that such privilege lacks legitimacy while pangs of conscience may indeed stem from legitimate wrong. The researchers test the effect of “system-justifying” manipulations designed to reduce such distress, showing that “the palliative effects of ideology may well lead to acquiescence and a withdrawal of support for social change and the redistribution of resources” (p. 268). Redistribution is thus a moral good that would help to right an existing moral wrong, and these studies are employed to find how to avoid acquiescence to an unfair system and to sustain support for social change, which depends on sustaining moral outrage, a motivator of action “designed to help the underprivileged” (p. 268). Further, the researchers explain, ideology that dampens moral outrage preserves “a distorted image of reality” by making the world appear fairer than it really is (p. 273). System justification and distortion of reality, then, are shored up by ideology. “Reality,” or the view that equal distribution of resources is right, is viewed as a good, while distortion of reality—or the view that privilege is justified—is viewed as bad. “Reality” itself is grounded in morality.

How the status quo is defended in a system of “haves” and “have-nots” is, according to Lammers, Stapel, and Galinsky (2010), a “question that lies at the heart of the social sciences” (p. 743), yet it is also a question of moral good and evil. In their study of moral hypocrisy among powerful members of society, the have-nots are “victims” of social inequality (p. 743). The researchers’ experimental manipulation is designed to show that inducing a sense of power increases entitlement in cheating and legal offenses while increasing stringency toward these behaviors in others. This hypocrisy along with the finding that inducing feelings of low power or illegitimate power results in hypercrisy (self-stringency and other-leniency) leads the researchers to assert that this pattern “perpetuate[s] social inequality” (p. 737). They further clarify their view that social inequality is a moral evil by offering ideas for revealing the “illegitimacy of the power distribution” and “curb[ing] self-enrichment by the powerful” (p. 743). As an alternative to open revolt, the researchers suggest “tainting [the powerful’s] reputation” through gossip and derision, thus inspiring their reform (p. 743).

Another form of social inequality considered a moral evil is gender inequity. Heflick, Goldenberg, Cooper, and Puvia (2011) find that manipulating participants to focus on appearance results in lower perceptions of warmth, competence, and morality for female but not male targets. The researchers suggest that evolved mechanisms are behind this phenomenon, but argue that denying women these basic human characteristics dehumanizes them and puts them at an unfair disadvantage in a society that places a high value on appearances (p. 573). Further, they assert, these effects also result in self-objectification with its host of associated negative effects (p. 572). The researchers explain that in addition to people being distressed at being dehumanized, the human characteristics are important to interpersonal perceptions in that people respond to others based on perceived intentions and capabilities: “low competence and low

warmth groups . . . are treated with active harm and passive neglect, and elicit contempt and disgust,” suggesting real-world conditions that contribute to “unique, negative consequences for women” (p. 579). The researchers are concerned about the high cultural emphasis on women’s appearance resulting in things that ought not to be (p. 579).

Though the other studies in this investigation do not focus specifically on inequality, many of them refer to related constructs in the context of harmful behaviors. For example, Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicius (2009) focus on disgust but manifest concern for its implications in terms of prejudice, social exclusion, stigma, and ethnocentrism (p. 104). Similarly, Zhong, Strejcek, and Sivanathan (2010) are concerned about “unintended consequences” of everyday cleanliness reminders for discrimination and prejudice (p. 859). Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) associate political ideology with a number of evils related to inequality (e.g., racism, fascism, stigma, acceptance of inequality), and Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) include as immoral behaviors greed, prejudice, sexism, racism, and taking advantage of the poor.

Others mention these and related behaviors, clearly with the intended meaning that inequality is a moral evil that *should* be addressed (e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Hutcherson and Gross, 2011; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Skitka et al., 2005). Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) suggest one way to avoid immoral behaviors such as selfishness: “[H]aving salient situational cues available” (p. 139) could help people maintain access to their moral identity.

The influence of valuing equality and devaluing inequality in this research figures at least in research emphases and explanations of findings, which seem to reflect public concerns inherently constituted at least partly by culture. While it may be impossible from these reports to assess exactly what counts as equality and inequality or to know the hierarchical structure of

priorities, it is likely that what counts and what is most important reflect cultural and personal moral values about what is right and what is wrong in human relationships. Hence, what science “shows” us in all of these reports would be value laden.

Harsh judgment. An area of human relationships that concerns many researchers is moral judgment of others’ behaviors. While none of these reports directly expresses that harsh moral judgment is immoral, some researchers imply it is wrong and at least potentially harmful. Tybur et al. (2009) hint that the need to understand the origin of our moral emotional responses stems from the idea that some “attitudes relating to particular social phenomena” *ought* to be changed (p. 118)—some moral judgments are unduly extreme, such as disgust-induced phobias and prejudices leading to avoidance of norm violators. The idea that it is wrong to judge others harshly may drive Helzer and Pizarro’s (2011) efforts to derogate specific harsh moral judgments as unreasonable by demonstrating a “deep link” between physical cleanliness and moral judgments of sexual behaviors (p. 517). Similarly, Eskine, Kacirik, and Prinz (2011) show that tasting a bitter drink increases the harshness of moral judgments, claiming their results demonstrate “how abstract concepts like morality could originate from sensory experiences” (p. 298). Conversely, Lee and Schwarz (2010) show that inducing cleanliness softens participants’ judgments of others’ moral misdeeds. If such findings constituted value-free reality, the reason of morality could legitimately be called into question, providing fuel for moral judgments against harsh moral judgments.

Schnall et al. (2008) find “activating intuitions about cleanliness” can “reduce the severity of moral judgments” that stems from disgust (p. 1222). They demonstrate how people make judgments about right and wrong based on intuitions “incidental and irrelevant to the object or situation being judged” (p. 1222). However, the researchers do not attribute their own

judgment about the wrongness of these moral judgments to incidental and irrelevant intuitions: “Recent studies have *demonstrated* that experimentally induced feelings of disgust can attach themselves to moral judgments, leading the person to conclude that a particular moral action is quite wrong” (p. 1219, italics added). Objective scientific findings support their view that such moral judgments are unduly severe.

Taking aim at “the moralization of purity,” Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, and Cohen (2009, p. 963) draw natural boundaries around different types of morality and demonstrate “the role of disgust in perceptions of moral goodness” (p. 973). They find that inducing disgust but not anger or sadness increases the harshness of judgments of purity but not harm violations. They also find that people high in disgust sensitivity (DS) mete out significantly harsher punishments exclusively to violators of purity issues than do those high in trait anger or trait fear. Hence, their findings “yield strong evidence” of “the specificity of the disgust-purity association,” supporting the theory that purity is “an evolved psychological foundation guiding judgments of right and wrong” (p. 972). Apart from disgust, the researchers find that participants lower in SES “attach greater moral significance to violating values of purity” (p. 970), suggesting that “lower SES individuals include purity concerns in their conception of morality, whereas upper SES individuals limit their sense of morality to concerns over harm and justice” (p. 973).

Uniquely associating moral judgments of purity issues with disgust and with those lower in socio-economic resources is one way to draw the important natural boundaries between types of moralization. Though different scientifically supported boundaries with different aims could be drawn, the researchers find no reason to question their framework, as their research is grounded in value-free methods. However, they suggest that framing makes an important difference to the subjective cultural renditions of morality. Regarding complex issues that span

several domains, they suggest that framing an issue “as a matter of justice or harm” rather than “in terms of purity” should dissociate the effects of disgust on moral judgments (Horberg et al., 2009, p. 973).

Seven studies by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) underscore the boundaries between two moral systems: one proscriptive and associated with harsh demands, moral blame, negative self-monitoring, and “lifestyle issues” such as legal abortion and gay marriage, the other prescriptive and associated with individual discretion, moral credit, positive obligations, and “equity issues” such as affirmative action and welfare (p. 535). While they acknowledge the problems of both systems “for advancing morality” (p. 535), their findings imply that a proscriptive system is likely to lead to a society in which the weight lies in monitoring of behaviors, whereas a prescriptive system places more weight on moral dispositions than on behaviors, leading to a society with a proclivity toward morality (p. 529). Further, the researchers’ approbation and disapproval is clear in their respective characterization of these systems: “condemnatory versus commendatory, blameworthy versus credit-worthy” (p. 534). Scientific findings may influence such approbation and disapproval without discrediting the value-free ideal, but it is plausible that valuing and devaluing specific types of moral systems or moral judgments of specific issues from the beginning influence the focus of the proverbial microscope and limit where boundaries are allowed to be drawn in research itself.

Other researchers similarly strive to characterize severe moral judgments of particular types: Zhong et al. (2010) demonstrate that inducing cleanliness “licenses severe moral judgments on morally contested issues such as abortion and pornography” (p. 859). Heflick et al. (2011) discuss moral ramifications of appearance-focus and the accompanying judgment of females as being less moral. Lammers et al. (2010) condemn moral hypocrisy in which the

powerful mete out severe judgments against “victims” of an unjust system while simultaneously feeling licensed to behave immorally (p. 743). These reports are presented as value-free knowledge gained through value-free scientific methods. At the same time, researcher values—ranging from apparent to implicit—are manifested in ways that leave open the possibility of influence from the outset of scientific study.

Intentional harm. Another relational theme running through moral psychology’s research reports involves the wrongness of intentionally causing harm or allowing harm to vulnerable others. Skitka et al. (2005) situate their assessment of moral convictions and accompanying intolerance in the context of “horrific” real-world acts of violence and their justification (p. 895). Their hope to contribute to “a greater social psychological understanding of morality” stems from “an increasing awareness that many forms of social conflict appear to be rooted in deep moral cleavages and . . . fundamental questions of right and wrong” (p. 915). Their research provides “evidence” supporting the idea that “maximum moral engagement” is a necessary prerequisite for such moral evils (p. 914). Associating moral convictions with horrific intentional moral evils could easily put a nail in the coffin for attempts to justify such attitudes. Did these researchers’ attitudes contribute to their scientific research findings? Proponents of the value-free ideal would flinch at the prospect, and yet framing the characteristics of moral convictions in this manner is an effective way to wholly undermine their justification. Such ideas should not plague value-free research, but a moral psychology with implicit presuppositions and inherent moral values could produce findings influenced by such intentions.

The wrongness of intentional harm is used to delineate other moral evils: Graham et al. (2009) associate political ideology with racism, fascism, stigma, acceptance of inequality, and violence. An item measuring the relative importance of the researchers’ Harm/care moral

foundation is a contextless and absolute denunciation of killing other people. While many people may hold the conviction that agreeing to the killing of others is evidence of a harmful attitude and lack of caring, the idea is laden with moral value. Researchers' values may unwittingly influence what passes for objective knowledge.

Most researchers are less absolute in denouncing intentional harm but clearly disvalue it: Aquino et al. (2009) refer to “the barbarism of a tyrant like Saddam Hussein” to represent the immoral pole of a “convenient” falsely dichotomous perception that some people are moral and others immoral (p. 123). The moral pole consists of “actions that demonstrate social responsiveness to the needs and interests of others” (p. 124), termed “prosociality” and clearly a moral good for many researchers. Autonomy violations from Sachdeva et al. (2009) refer to administering shocks and taking advantage of the poor (p. 523) as ostensibly immoral behaviors that induce moral cleansing. For Shu, Gino, and Bazerman (2011), “dehumanizing victims” (p. 331) and “hurtful behaviors” like cheating on a spouse or standing by instead of stopping “atrocious acts” (p. 345) manifest moral disengagement. Wakslak et al. (2007) refer to victims that suffer because less vulnerable others withdraw support for social change. These researchers imply that violence and other forms of intentional harm are moral evils—that nobody *should* do them or idly watch them happen if they can help to prevent them (see also Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Jordan et al., 2011; Lammers et al., 2010; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).

Dishonesty. Forms of lying, cheating, and stealing are frequently used to represent harmful behaviors in research measures and scenarios (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Tybur et al., 2009) or manipulated as part of a study (e.g., Jordan et al., 2011; Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Lammers et al., 2010;). Sachdeva et al. (2009) explain that when people

cheat, they feel the need for moral cleansing to feel better about themselves. Leach et al.'s 2007 assertion that in-group morality is more important than competence or sociability is explained in terms of trustworthiness and sincerity: "immoral competence is dangerous, and immoral sociability is disingenuous" (p. 236). Jordan et al.'s (2011) research manipulation caused participants to cheat more or less, demonstrating that morality is manipulable and dynamic. These researchers seem to disvalue dishonesty.

Nearly all of these researchers at least mention some aspect of dishonesty in relation to harm or immorality, and research findings may be influenced by this moral value. However, they may have differing ideas about what dishonesty means. Aquino et al. (2009) set harmful dishonest behavior in context of a broader sense of dishonesty: "people are especially likely to act in ways that are harmful to others in situations in which such behavior can be rationalized" (p. 123). Rationalization involves an attempt to justify a behavior that goes against one's understanding of right and wrong. In this sense, rationalizing itself is dishonest. Wakslak et al. (2007) consider assuaging the distressing emotions that might lead to system change to be a form of rationalization in which people justify doing nothing to help the disadvantaged. This, then, is also a form of dishonesty.

Shu et al. (2011) share this broader understanding of dishonesty, including abusing a controlled substance, cheating on a spouse, and victim blaming as behaviors resulting from moral disengagement and self-justification invoked to alleviate dissonance caused by behaving immorally. While they implicate dishonest behavior itself as the catalyst for moral disengagement, they note, "seemingly innocuous aspects of the environment can promote the decision to act honestly or dishonestly" (p. 345). Thus, the researchers advocate increasing awareness of ethical standards by simple means such as honor codes. "[S]eemingly innocuous"

implies potentially dangerous—due to resulting dishonest behaviors—clearly a moral concern. Advocating awareness of ethical standards is no less a moral concern.

While value-laden moral intuition is seen as a less reliable guide than value-free scientific research in predicting dishonest behavior, value-laden intuition seems to be a necessary condition of any meaning of dishonest behavior or morality in general. In moral psychology research the meanings of dishonesty and morality vary. Zhong et al. (2010) have a different understanding of dishonesty; they include adultery and recreational drug use on a survey that measures severity of judgment against “morally contested issues” (p. 859), or “social behaviors [that] engender no real danger to others” (p. 862). Such varying views of honesty and morality could have important implications for moral psychology’s findings and their influence on consumers.

Clashing moral views. In some cases of clashing views, moral psychologists manifest distress. Sachdeva et al. (2009) are concerned that moral licensing leads to less willingness to cooperate, while Skitka et al. (2005) view “deep moral cleavages” as seedbeds for intolerance and horrific violence (p. 915). Leach et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of in-group morality, noting its implications for intergroup relations. These researchers manifest the view that people *ought* to get along, not mind being with people of differing views, not judge each other harshly, and work together for good.

Feinberg and Willer (2013) consider poor communication between political groups a detriment to the advancement of proenvironmental action. Since liberal ideology seems to reflect proenvironmental attitudes, the researchers’ studies aim to “improve communication between opposing sides” (p. 61) by reframing environmental messages for conservatives, who may be at a different “stage of moral development” (p. 57). Indeed, the researchers’ efforts successfully

“reduce the gap between liberals and conservatives in environmental concerns” (p. 56). Not only are clashing views a moral problem that needs solving, but this solution seems to involve directing views toward a specific moral good.

Table 10 provides passages from several articles as the authors articulate clashing views between liberals and conservatives. Many of these focus on the empirically supported unique association between conservative views, disgust, and unduly severe judgments of purity violations such as deviant sexual behaviors. For example, Eskine et al. (2011) assert that conservatives are more disgusted and make harsher moral judgments because they are more vulnerable than liberals to the influence of “extraneous emotions” irrelevant to the judgments themselves (p. 298). Helzer and Pizarro (2011) find that in conservatives but not liberals, common cleanliness reminders increase disgust and “hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior (p. 517). What counts as “hypervigilant” or too severe is ostensibly a statistically derived and objective aggregate level of severity of conservative as compared to liberal moral judgment, though it may imply values regarding how disturbed people *ought* or *ought not* to be about specified things.

Horberg et al. (2009) also manifest concern about the clash between liberal and conservative views, in particular the condemnation associated with moral judgments in regards to specific issues exclusively linked to disgust and conservative ideology. Like Feinberg and Willer (2013), they suggest reframing these issues in terms of freedom and rights instead of purity in order to reduce conservatives’ amplification of moral judgments caused by disgust, implying that such a change would be a moral good. Condemnatory morality is also a concern of Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009), who associate a harsh proscriptive system with conservatives who regulate “lifestyle” behaviors (p. 535). Conversely, they associate liberal views with prescriptive

positive “equity” obligations, using their studies to show that such a system is conducive to dispositional morality—a more moral society (p. 535). Not surprisingly, their study on clashing views has a prescriptive flavor: ideology associated with dispositional morality and a more moral society can hardly be found unworthy.

Whereas Haidt and others worry about political bias in social psychology research (Duarte et. al, 2015), it is illuminating to survey terms used in the Graham et al. (2009) report to describe the differences between the two ideologies said to undergird America’s intractable “culture war” (p. 1029). Drawing on theory and empirical research, the researchers call attention to the association of racism, fascism, blind obedience, and stigma to the “binding foundations” thought to be the special province of conservative ideology. They explain, “the two core aspects of conservative ideology are resistance to change and acceptance of inequality” (p. 1030). On the other hand, while they acknowledge that the “individualizing foundations” thought to be especially important to liberals may be associated with both justice and blood feuds, this ideology involves an optimistic view, openness to experience, and an emphasis on fairness and care (p. 1030).

The empirically supported boundaries between these types provide validity for moral foundations theory, which the authors believe is “the best starting point” for identifying “the most important sources of moral intuition across cultures” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1041) and a “useful way to conceptualize and measure [moral] convictions” (p. 1042). Indeed, moral foundations theory informs most of the reports analyzed in the present investigation. In testing the theory, psychologists would expect to produce value-free data from which value-free findings are drawn to inform people about the “really real” truth about moral intuitions and moral convictions (Shweder, 1991, p. 64). Under this assumption, one might allow that if the

value-free findings in this report lead people to value liberal ideology and disvalue conservative ideology, it is because those individuals value fairness, care, optimism, and openness over racism, fascism, stigma, and inequality—not because inherent values guide the research that delineates the boundaries between ideologies.

However, if the specific concerns of Duarte et al. (2015) are realized and liberal values are inadvertently embedded in research on political differences, findings may reflect researchers' ideology. The meaning of harm in the Graham et al. (2009) report is worth exploring as it applies to clashing views between liberals and conservatives. As discussed above under “intentional harm,” the researchers use four items for each of five moral domains to measure its relative importance. An item measuring the harm domain, which is supposed to be less important to people with conservative ideology, is stated as an absolute wrong regardless of context: “It can never be right to kill a human being” (p. 1044). If this item alone eliminates a number of research participants from appearing to care a great deal about harm and care, it effectively influences the boundaries drawn around categories that pass for natural types in moral psychology's reports.

The importance of what does *not* count as harm for these researchers may be more implicit. They note, “many issues related to food, sex, clothing, prayer, and gender roles [are treated] as moral issues even when they *involve no harm to any person*” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1030, italics added). Even if research participants do not count these things as harmful in the same way as killing, it is possible that some items count as harm or not harm in ways inaccessible to the presuppositions of this research. The meaning of harm may be poorly understood, as may be the case with care, fairness, respect, and other domain terms. With these terms lacking objective meanings, it seems likely that the respective measures would reflect inherent assumptions and values, thus unavoidably biasing results.

Problems based in mechanistic morality. The previous section highlighted themes regarding moral problems and goods in moral psychology discourse that point to moral values that may be inherent in research. This section further illuminates potentially inherent values by discussing the affirmed explanations of the sources of the moral problems and goods that researchers discuss. Some of these values may be considered epistemic; studying moral behavior in terms of efficient causal mechanisms seems to be protocol for mainstream psychology. However, scholars dispute the idea that the most valid knowledge about morality can be discerned from this perspective (e.g., Slife & Williams, 1995). Nonetheless, researchers seem to value a mechanistic paradigm to facilitate the formulating of predictions about moral behaviors that can be tested to derive universal principles. Research not only reveals the valuing of this paradigm, but it also illuminates what researchers hold as more good, less good, or bad.

First and foremost, researchers describe morality in terms of mechanisms that evolved because they facilitated survival and reproduction. A mechanistic view allows for interventions via experimental manipulations to drive different outcomes, which are often viewed as good or bad. Within the current program of moral psychology, morality is grounded largely in intuitive and emotional rather than deliberative cognitive processes. While morality itself is rendered highly manipulable and irrational, moral psychology research is purported to be the voice of authority concerning value-free facts about moral judgments. Nonetheless, Tybur et al. (2009) hint that the need to understand the origin of our moral emotional responses stems from the idea that some “attitudes relating to particular social phenomena” *ought* to be changed (p. 118)—some attitudes are superior to others. Implicit moral values related to mechanistic morality in these articles can be categorized into three themes: 1) The good and bad of evolved morality, 2) Manipulable morality and immorality, and 3) The better and worse of irrational moral judgments.

The good and bad of evolved morality. Although not all of these researchers explicitly ground their theories exclusively in evolutionary principles, none of them suggest a basis for morality other than its functional role in survival and reproduction, and all their reports are compatible with the paradigm. Leach et al. (2007) suggest that morality is essential to the group life of primates such as humans because it helps people “maximize benefits for themselves and the group as a whole” (p. 236). Maximizing benefits for the self and the group is seen as good. Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) note that a proscriptive moral system would have been useful in that “organisms attuned to bad outcomes” would survive better due to “greater consequences of ignoring harmful, dangerous outcomes than positive outcomes” (p. 524). However, the researchers suggest that this evolved system is not always optimal; their report manifests preference for a prescriptive system because it is more discretionary and conducive to dispositional morality—moral goods that trump the demands of self-monitoring.

Moral motivation, within limits, is also seen as a moral good, and an evolved need for self-consistency is thought to be “a powerful source” of this commodity (Aquino et al., 2009, p. 124). But Jordan et al. (2011) assert that this need is largely responsible for “the dynamics of moral behavior” (p. 701) in which striving for self-completeness results in both moral cleansing (good) and moral licensing (bad). However, when immoral behavior disrupts this balance and results in cognitive dissonance, it is also thought to cause rationalization that results in more immoral behavior. Some researchers manifest dismay: “Alarmingly, these dissonance-provoked changes in attitudes may be durable over time” (Shu et al., 2011, p. 331).

Similarly, Sachdeva et al. (2009) note that while “people’s self-worth is defined to a large extent by how moral they perceive themselves to be,” immoral behavior can stem from “an internal balancing of moral self-worth and the cost inherent in altruistic behavior” (p. 523). The

researchers suggest that immoral behavior, which can be triggered by the environment, may result in attitudes that license more immoral behavior. People should practice “costly” moral behaviors until they become automatic, because automatic behaviors may not be as susceptible to the balancing act that underlies motivations to behave immorally (p. 528).

While natural “self-interest and motivated reasoning” (Lammers et al., 2010, p. 742) are thought to drive immoral behaviors such as hypocrisy in those who feel a sense of power, the *idea* that some behaviors are immoral supposedly began with self-interest and motivated reasoning in the first place. Schnall et al. (2008) suggest that those mechanisms that evolved to protect the body from pathogens somehow extended to social and moral domains. While protecting the body from pathogens may be seen as good, the extension to other domains may be valued or disvalued according to the specific issue. Horberg et al. (2009) are not indifferent to the idea that “values originally related to the evolutionary challenges of avoiding . . . toxins” now influence condemnation of violations within the purity realm (p. 964), which “[constrains] the pursuit of personal goals” (p. 974). Personal goals, then, are goods that suffer infringement at the expense of the disvalued extension of another good. Similarly, Hutcherson and Gross (2011) explain that the moral emotions evolved to reduce risk of exposure to harm, yet at the same time they increase “prejudice toward the most stigmatized, dehumanized minorities” (p. 723). They argue that when threat from another person is imminent, “vigorous defense or attack can be the quickest way to resolve the danger, despite the potential risks and energy expenditure” (p. 720). However, when the threat to self is not direct, “passive avoidance may be a less costly means” of dealing with it. The researchers argue that moral disgust and contempt serve this purpose—“to mark individuals whose behavior suggests that they represent a threat and avoid them, thereby reducing the risk of exposure to harm” (p. 720). Thus, mechanisms explain both protection and

prejudice. A mechanistic evolutionary account of morality is valued in moral psychology, and the affirmed effects of the mechanisms are apparently valued and disvalued according to a priori ideas about what is good and what is bad.

Manipulable morality and immorality. Since a mechanistic view of morality is valued, researchers study human behavior by adding a mechanistic element to manipulate responses that are more or less valued. The environment is often implicated as a source of such manipulation, and experiments are designed to mirror such effects. Aquino et al. (2009) demonstrate through a series of experimental manipulation a complicated series of events leading to less moral behavior: “if a situational factor increases the current accessibility of moral identity within the working self-concept, then it strengthens the motivation to act morally. In contrast, if a situational factor decreases the current accessibility of moral identity, then it weakens the motivation to act morally” (p. 123). The researchers measure participants’ centrality of moral identity and find this measure predicts vulnerability to environmental cues to behave morally or immorally. The authors worry that environmentally induced immoral behavior may result in high distress or self-condemnation for those with highly central moral identity, which in turn may manifest as “elaborate forms of cognitive rationalization” (p. 139).

Shu et al. (2011) are also concerned about cognitive dissonance, in this case due to “morally permissive” environments that increase cheating and moral disengagement so behavior is at odds with beliefs (p. 330). Successful manipulations of their research participants show, “[a]ction, belief, and memory are more susceptible to situational nudges than intuition leads us to believe” (p. 345). The bad news is that “once people behave dishonestly, they are able to morally disengage, setting off a downward spiral of future bad behavior” (p. 345). The good news is that “this slippery slope can be forestalled with simple measures, such as honor codes, that increase

people’s awareness of ethical standards” (p. 345)—research is designed to show that changing the environment in certain ways decreases immoral behaviors. Similarly, Feinberg and Willer (2013) suggest changes to facilitate a moral good; the framing of moral issues influences moral judgments. In their experimental manipulations, presenting proenvironmental messages from a moral purity perspective increased support in politically conservative participants.

Not all researchers offer solutions to moral problems, but they demonstrate how manipulations cause valued or disvalued behaviors. Jordan et al.’s (2011) study involves manipulating the salience of participants’ past moral or immoral behaviors. They find that those who remember their immoral behaviors cheat less, while those who feel good about their moral selves cheat more. Thus both moral and immoral behaviors are manipulable, and the researchers appear to tacitly disvalue cheating. Other reports involving experimental manipulations seem to imply the disvaluing of severe moral judgments stemming from evolved mechanisms. Lee and Schwarz (2010) show that inducing cleanliness softens participants’ judgments of others’ moral misdeeds. Helzer and Pizarro (2011), on the other hand, show that a manipulation mirroring everyday cleanliness reminders increases the severity of evaluations of sexual behaviors (see also Zhong et al., 2010). Eskin et al. (2011) find that while disgusting tastes trigger harsh moral judgments, sweet tastes trigger favorable ones. These researchers seem to value softened and favorable moral judgments over severe and harsh ones, while disvaluing “an inflated sense of moral self” (Zhong et al., 2010, p. 860).

However, all researchers do not value all favorable or softened moral judgments. Feinberg and Willer’s (2013) manipulation included aiming for more stringent moral judgments against a target who did not recycling a water bottle. Wakslak et al. (2007) make a strong case for needing not a soft existential guilt but a powerful moral outrage against the unfairness of a

system that perpetuates inequality. Lammers et al. (2010) advocate breaking “the spiral of inequality” with direct aggression against the hypocrisy of the powerful in accordance with findings that manipulating a sense of power increases moral hypocrisy in participants (p. 743). Finally, Heflick et al. (2011) are also unlikely to value softened moral judgments against the dehumanization of females.

The better and worse of irrational moral judgments. Moral dilemma studies often include vignettes involving trade-offs between killing and saving people. Utilitarian judgments (preserving the most life by whatever means) are sometimes referred to as appropriate, while deontological judgments (action deemed wrong in any situation) are sometimes referred to as biased. What people are likely to do in moral dilemmas has real moral implications, and a major aim of research seems to be to show how judgments are often unreasonable—almost as if this view of morality itself were valued.

Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) demonstrate that people are often unaware of the principles guiding their responses. Inability to articulate justification for moral judgments generally counts as its being unavailable to conscious processes (p. 1087). This helps to explain the lack of optimal responses in moral judgments. Conway and Gawronski (2013) present participants with an empathic prime to demonstrate how it increases deontological responding. They also measure moral identity to show that utilitarian responses reflect a genuine desire to “maximize welfare” rather than less concern for harm (p. 228). These researchers seem to disvalue indifference to suffering, but also to value deliberative over purely deontological processes. Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008) refer to emotional “biases against responding” in certain ways that cause harm (p. 550), finding that high working-memory-capacity (WMC) predicts deliberative responses. Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) demonstrate how irrelevant cues

influence moral decisions, adding, “Whether such an influence *optimizes* or *biases* the resulting decision depends on the relevance of the extraneous affective cues to the dilemma at hand” (p. 477, italics added).

A favored way to associate irrationality with morality is through research in disgust. Tybur et al. (2009) associate moral disgust with phobias and clinical disorders as well as prejudice. Many of the manipulations cited in the previous section were designed to show how extraneous cues, such as induced disgust, prime people and influence their moral judgments (e.g., Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Horberg et al., 2009; Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Schnall et al., 2008; Zhong et al., 2010). Eskin et al. (2011) wonder if jurors should “avoid overly bitter or sweet foods as they deliberate a verdict” so as to avoid irrational effects on their judgments (p. 298).

Researchers imply that behaviors such as less cooperation with and more intolerance for dissimilar others have highly irrational elements. Skitka et al. (2005) differentiate between strong nonmoral attitudes and strong moral attitudes by associating the latter with cognitive inflexibility, low integrative complexity in cognition, resistance to counterfactual reasoning, and an irrational belief in a “collective moral order” (p. 914). All of these implicate moral convictions as being irrational as well as harmful. While these researchers may not be “chronically intolerant” of moral convictions (p. 914), they clearly manifest their devaluing of them.

Gray and Wegner (2009) show how mechanisms guiding inversely related perceptions of moral agency and patiency (those who act and those who are acted upon) lead to irrational typecasting. Their research shows how being perceived as a moral agent—good or bad—renders one likely to receive less help and more harm. Researchers’ emphasis on irrational and irrelevant triggers may indicate inherent value assumptions about how morality is best understood. Perhaps tongue-in-cheek, the authors offer “a particularly effective technique” for self-presentation to

reap the benefits and avoid the costs of this moral typecasting: “casting oneself as a moral patient” (p. 519).

Conclusion. The themes highlighted above involve moral goods and evils defining the way people *ought* and *ought not* to be—moral values. Researchers may also hold views on how people *ought* to prioritize these moral goods—moral values again. Moreover, it seems unlikely they can be expunged from a research program in which the researchers value them. Inasmuch as research focuses on such concerns, the potential for value involvement in moral psychology—even central to a research program—seems high.

Discussion

These analyses highlight a conflict between two important ideas: 1) Moral psychology operates according to a value-free ideal, revealing knowledge about human moral behaviors and judgments more valid and objective than other types of knowledge, and 2) Values are inherent in and inextricable from moral psychology’s research findings. While value-free science is valued for providing “a relatively fair and unbiased means of mapping the world,” scholars have theoretically unraveled the possibility of value-free knowledge and have noted problems associated with the value-free ideal (Slife et al., 2012, p. 737).

In this project I asked, “What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like?” Both content analysis and cultural discourse analysis point to a pervasive distribution of such ideas. Every article suggests—if only implicitly—a moral problem or a moral good, a notion of what is naturally harmful to humans, a notion of what a better world would look like, and an obligation for psychologists to help toward that end. My second question, “Does moral psychology promote values as if they were objective and value free?” is also illuminated by both analyses. Every article manifests ontological dualism by asserting objectivity

assumed to be separable from the subjective realm inhabited by regular human thought, the value of minimizing subjectivity through method, and a notion presented as value-free fact of what humans are naturally like. If these researchers assume an objective realm accessible by method that reveals to them a universal human nature including what is good and bad for humans, moral values would seem to be inherently involved while at the same time being refuted by adherence to the value-free ideal.

The extent to which values influence research outcomes cannot be ascertained here, but the value-free ideal seems to have no threatening contenders. These are not epistemic values, yet they seem to be inherent and inevitably influential at the heart of research, in that some position must be taken about how best to understand morality and what humans should be like. These values appear to guide the creation of items for research measures, scientific boundaries and associations placed between categories, the tone and emphases of research reports, as well as researcher suggestions for alleviating moral problems. As noted previously, the implications of value ladenness in moral psychology may be viewed as a microcosm of those in the wider discipline of psychology where ideas about what is good and bad for humans are part and parcel to research and practice. Whether value influence is responsible or biased depends on the issue—and the point of view. While values may seem a “serious threat” to science (see Eichmann 2008, p. 11), they may also serve to make science valid (e.g., Nozick, 1998; Douglas, 2007), socially relevant (Root, 2007), adequately informative to consumers (Slife et al., 2012), and socially responsible (Teo, 2015). As born out by the research reports of this investigation, values guide researchers to help solve human problems.

On the other hand, values may stimulate human problems as great as those they solve (e.g., Bohm, 2002, p. 2) or the marginalization of designated groups (Teo, 2015). Value-free

idealism may *hinder* scientific objectivity by restraining consideration of important perspectives (Wylie and Nelson, 2007), and suppression resulting in obscuring them. This analysis highlights where researchers' varying conceptions of honesty and morality may influence moral psychology's findings, and without examination of those values, unpopular perspectives are indeed likely to be ignored. As cultures are at least partly responsible for the meanings of honesty and morality (see Isotalus, 2009), it would seem that morally contested definitions of honesty and morality are widespread and may be conceptualized according to culturally defined epistemic values with consequential implications. In Machiavellian terms, taking advantage of the poor may not reflect dishonesty but pragmatism. According to economic theory, the intuition that "sexual abuse of children inflicts deep psychological harm" may "reflect an irrational taboo about the sexuality of children" (Posner, 1992, p. 396). Given many versions of dishonesty and morality and many epistemological paradigms, I would argue that adhering to a value-free ideal in moral psychology not only is a kind of deception hindering consumers of its knowledge from requisite evaluation, but also leaves the field vulnerable to a sort of tunnel vision aimed at popular ideologies.

Whether one frames values as "biases" depends on one's point of view, but to overlook them is to neglect responsibility to researchers and consumers alike. While many values would seem to be inappropriate for scientific research even in a value-disclosure culture, a value-free ideal is likely to hide rather than expunge them. My major concern in publishing this report is that moral psychologists would respond by redoubling their efforts to obscure their values in disinterested language, making it even more difficult to discern the assumptions behind their research. It is fairer to consumers to reveal inappropriate values than to hide them behind a cloak of disinterested terms.

Science is different from other ways of knowing and is invaluable in understanding the world and how to reach human goals, yet a value-free ideal in psychology may be detrimental to society. Considerable efforts toward expunging biases are routine, yet biases continue to be seen as problematic in research (e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Pashler & Harris, 2012). Attempting to balance political or other views, as Duarte et al. (2015) suggest, may be helpful, but this neither removes values from research nor directly promotes requisite examination of values. Further, presenting moral psychology's knowledge as value free when it is laden with moral values exacerbates potential problems, positioning researchers much as "high priests" of moral psychology (see Plantinga, 2011, p. 307). For these reasons, I argue that the value-free ideal should be replaced with value disclosure in psychology. In the next section I discuss some limitations of the current study and offer suggestions in this vein from scholars' theoretical work on values in psychology.

Limitations and Future Directions

The present analyses. As is the case with any research, the methods and analyses of my project are inherently biased and interpreted. In being aware of my own biases, however, I am able to pay attention to them. The addition of alternate codes in the codebook was helpful in providing a contrast for each code and revealing coder discrepancies (see Table 5). Additionally, I tried to incorporate into my analyses the idea of radical openness, or surprisability, elements of which are discussed further below (Slife, Johnson, & Jennings, 2015).

The second coder coded 20% of the data, and multiple coders covering a higher percentage of data would show a broader perspective on the level of interrater reliability. There is no limit to how many texts may have been included in the analysis, and anomalous views in moral psychology may have been missed because of the current cut-off of 25 articles. Some

discrepancies between coders were likely due to the need for codebook clarification. It would be helpful to develop this codebook further to be useful in future value investigations.

A culture of value disclosure. Research cannot be both laden with inherent moral values and value free, but this does not relegate moral psychology or psychology in general to a state of “anything goes” relativism. This false dichotomy has been soundly refuted by theoreticians, many who have offered alternate approaches to dealing with values inherent in disciplinary work.

In light of serious implications that the value-free ideal in moral psychology is problematic, particularly that a prevalent value-free ideal sustains the potential for deception, intentional or unwitting, I advocate value disclosure as a serious and continuing effort. Value disclosure does not exhaust approaches for dealing with inherent values in moral psychology, but I submit that a culture of value disclosure should replace the culture of value-free idealism. Psychologists are obligated to pay attention to the dissemination of knowledge and take responsibility for effectively informing consumers (see Dupré, 2001). Routine disclaimers and cautions may not be enough to stem the tide of misinformation once in the hands of purveyors of moral psychology’s knowledge.

If researchers must begin with assumptions and values, they need guidelines for managing the values inherent in their research. Much work needs to be done concerning how to systematize the disclosure of values to encourage researchers to attend to rather than hide or attempt to bracket their values. If value disclosure is user unfriendly, it will not adequately fulfill its function. Efforts have been made, often in disciplines other than psychology, to deal with values in ways that involve value disclosure instead of adherence to the value-free ideal (e.g.,

Yanchar, 2016). Theoretical psychologists offer conceptualizations of these efforts that may benefit psychology. These are discussed below as three things that researchers should do:

- 1) Attend to and acknowledge assumptions, including epistemic ones
- 2) Adequately define and contextualize terms with important alternate meanings
- 3) Increase the depth and breadth of critical thinking, including surprisability

Assumptions. Assumptions reflect values with important implications often ignored in reports (Slife & Williams, 1995), such as assumptions about what it means to be “human” (Williams, 2002). A particularly pervasive value assumption in this investigation is the view that humans are fundamentally mechanistic with no genuine agency—not a neutral position, but an assumption with implications important to research method and critical to interpretation of findings. Researchers need to own and acknowledge their own position on this issue and consider alternatives, informing consumers so they are better able to evaluate findings.

For example, when Shu et al. (2011) suggest that their studies demonstrate that dishonesty leads to self-justification, which leads to moral disengagement and further dishonesty, they should acknowledge their position either that this is an efficient causal chain that humans are locked into until an intervention is applied from outside the system or that this is a human tendency at least in the context of the studies themselves. The difference may seem trivial, but the implications of requiring an applied intervention are quite different from those of genuine contextual agency. In the first, people implementing a moral code intervention would expect that with continued adjustments, dishonesty could be eliminated (see p. 344), whereas in the second, the effectiveness of any intervention would be viewed as subject to rupture.

Defining meanings. When psychologists draw empirically-derived boundaries around such categories as “harm” and “fairness” as if they are objective and universal, they ignore the

value-ladenness of such meanings and fail to recognize different contextual meanings people hold for these terms. Though researchers reveal in part their values by what they include in and exclude from measures, methods, and interpretations, they fail to provide clear definitions for consumers. The value of tolerance may be apparent without researchers' acknowledging it as a value, but the consumer is left to ask, "Tolerance of what?" If such terms are part of a scientific research program, researchers need to own and clearly state these meanings. An adequate understanding of one's own meanings may involve considering alternate meanings and their implications as well as different meanings for different contexts, and this should be reflected in the definitions of terms.

In Graham et al. (2009), terms such as "harm" and "justice" abound. Meanings may be somewhat accessible through close inspection of research measures and other clues throughout the research report, but clear definitions from which to interpret the researchers' claims are lacking. For example, "harm" is likely to have contested meanings, and this report would be much clearer to consumers if researchers considered alternate meanings and included the researchers' definitions with examples of what counts and what does not count as harm within specific contexts.

Critical thinking and surprisability. Yanchar, Slife, and Warne (2008) provide suggestions for a "perspectival, relational, and interpretive" approach for dealing with values that has potential to increase the depth and breadth of critical thinking so essential to disciplinary progress (p. 265). They view science as a human knowledge-gathering endeavor that requires ongoing critical dialogue that includes compassion, sympathy, and respect for other views and in which guidelines and methods are established as tentative rather than permanent fixtures. Such an approach clears a space for effortful surprisability, a kind of openness that may help

researchers to broaden the scope of their understanding (Slife et al., 2015). Components of surprisability include awareness of one's own assumptions, softening of those assumptions in recognizing that other interpretations may be informative, considering alternatives, and paying attention to particularity. With these researchers, I submit that value disclosure reflecting such critical reasoning should be a hallmark of science.

In Skitka et al. (2005), the researchers suggest that moral convictions are components of justification for intolerance and horrific violence. While their report discloses important researcher values rather than obscuring them as so many reports do, it could benefit substantially by using the critical approach advocated by Yanchar et al. (2008). The report aims to show how moral convictions are irrational and engender serious societal ills, but a studied effort involving respect for alternative views could reveal perspectival and contextual information critical to an understanding of moral convictions.

Conclusion

As Duarte et al. (2015) suggest, efforts to diversify views within moral psychology would help to avoid marginalization of some alternate values. But researchers also need to disclose their values through a critical approach to their own assumptions and meanings, maintaining scientific validity without obscuring values behind a value-free ideal. If presupposed values are inevitable in psychological science while the value-free ideal is championed, implicit values are not likely to be examined, and they may be obscured without awareness. Failure to examine them could amount to avoiding disciplinary responsibility; psychologists could avoid consideration of important values that *should* guide disciplinary practices as well as values that limit science and impose dominant views on others. The moral values needed to guide disciplinary practices could easily give way to other less important implicit values, with psychological science imposing its

value-laden knowledge as value-free on an unwitting public. I have attempted to approach this responsibility through examining inherent values in moral psychology.

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Appendix A: Tables A1-A10

TABLE A1 - 25 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY ARTICLES 2005-2015

in descending order of average number of citations per year

| Authors (year) | Title | Journal | Citations per year |
|---|---|---------|--------------------|
| 1-Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009) | Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations | JPSP | 58.86 |
| 2-Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006) | The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm | PS | 29.70 |
| 3-Tybur, J. M., Lieberman, D., & Griskevicius, V. (2009) | Microbes, mating, and morality: Individual differences in three functional domains of disgust | JPSP | 20.86 |
| 4-Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A. I., Lim, V. G., & Felps, W. (2009) | Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality | JPSP | 18.86 |
| 5-Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008) | With a clean conscience: Cleanliness reduces the severity of moral judgments | PS | 17.50 |
| 6-Sachdeva, S., Iliiev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009) | Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of moral self-regulation | PS | 17.43 |
| 7-Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007) | Group virtue: The importance of morality (vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups | JPSP | 16.78 |
| 8-Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2006) | Manipulations of emotional context shape moral judgment | PS | 16.60 |
| 9-Eskine, K. J., Kacirik, N. A., & Prinz, J. J. (2011) | A bad taste in the mouth: Gustatory disgust influences moral judgment | PS | 15.80 |
| 10-Horberg, E. J., Oveis, C., Keltner, D., & Cohen, A. B. (2009) | Disgust and the moralization of purity | JPSP | 14.43 |
| 11-Hutcherson, C. A., & Gross, J. J. (2011) | The moral emotions: A social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt | JPSP | 13.40 |
| 12-Lammers, J., Stapel, D. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010) | Power increases hypocrisy: Moralizing in reasoning, immorality in behavior | PS | 13.00 |
| 13-Moore, A. B., Clark, B. A., & Kane, M. J. (2008) | Who shall not kill? Individual differences in working memory capacity, executive control, and moral judgment | PS | 12.50 |
| 14-Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005) | Moral conviction: Another contributor to attitude strength or something more? | JPSP | 11.73 |
| 15-Jordan, J., Mullen, E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011) | Striving for the moral self: The effects of recalling past moral actions on future moral behavior | PSPB | 11.60 |
| 16-Lee, S. S., & Schwarz, N. (2010) | Dirty hands and dirty mouths: Embodiment of the moral purity metaphor is specific to the motor modality involved in moral transgression | PS | 11.50 |
| 17-Feinberg, M., & Willer, R. (2013) | The moral roots of environmental attitudes | PS | 11.33 |
| 18-Shu, L. L., Gino, F., & Bazerman, M. H. (2011) | Dishonest deed, clear conscience: When cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting | PSPB | 11.20 |
| 19-Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Hepp, S. (2009) | Proscriptive versus prescriptive morality: Two faces of moral regulation | JPSP | 11.00 |
| 20-Zhong, C., Strojcek, B., & Sivanathan, N. (2010) | A clean self can render harsh moral judgment | JESP | 10.33 |
| 21-Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013) | Deontological and utilitarian inclination in moral decision making: A process dissociation approach | JPSP | 10.33 |
| 22-Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2009) | Moral typecasting: Divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients | JPSP | 10.14 |
| 23-Helzer, E. G., & Pizarro, D. A. (2011) | Dirty liberals!: Reminders of physical cleanliness influence moral and political attitudes | PS | 9.80 |
| 24-Wakslak, C. J., Jost, J. T., Tyler, T. R., & Chen, E. S. (2007) | Moral outrage mediates the dampening effect of system justification on support for redistributive social policies | PS | 9.11 |
| 25-Heflick, N. A., Goldenberg, J. L., Cooper, D. P., & Puvia, E. (2011) | From women to objects: Appearance focus, target gender, and perceptions of warmth, morality and competence | JESP | 9.00 |

TABLE A2 - CODEBOOK OF IMPLICIT VALUES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Interrater reliability (K)*

| I. Value-free science - What values do moral psychologists manifest regarding how best to obtain interdisciplinary knowledge? | | 0.2494 |
|--|--|--------|
| Mnemonic | 1 OBSERVABLE (OBSERVABLE EVENTS) | |
| Short description | To make research less subjective, researchers study complex nonobservable phenomena by <i>narrowly</i> framing accessible operational definitions that stand in for them. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers try to remove subjectivity by concisely defining in accessible observational terms what counts as a phenomenon. These narrow operational definitions prescribe in limited terms what counts as evidence. Though almost anything used to systematize a study may be an operational definition, this code refers to those that are simplified to impoverished meanings. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Impoverished qualitative or quantitative measures taken as valid stand-ins for complex phenomena; questions on measures that stand in for complex phenomena; numbers named in the same passage as the constructs they stand in for (other appearances of such numbers belong only in quantitative); models standing in for complex phenomena; neuro-images standing in as valid evidence for non-observable experience; exclusion or marginalization of the subjectivity involved in more meaningful representations of phenomena; implying that narrowly-defined data are less subjective | |
| Key terms | Measure, instrument, self-report, Likert scale, model | |
| Related codes | Method Driven, Quantitative, Universal, Dualism, Prediction | |
| Exclusion criteria | Passages in which the observable item (measure, model, etc.) are not included; reports of statistical procedures not stating direct association with nonobservables; observational data retaining qualities of importance; narrow observables not taken to be less subjective than other ways of knowing | |
| Typical exemplar | "The core premise of the present research is that moral judgment is inadequate in accounting for moral action and that personality variables may go a considerable way toward bridging that gap" (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 845). | |
| Atypical exemplar | "[D]ifferences between exemplars in agentic aspects were not revealed, despite such intimations in people's conceptions of bravery" (Walker & Frimer, 2007, pp. 857-8). (<i>they were not found because the specified observation didn't show up</i>) | |
| Mnemonic | 1a NONOBSERVABLE (NONOBSERVABLE MEANINGS) | |
| Short description | Researchers study nonobservable phenomena using systematic approaches emphasizing important meanings over value freedom. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers recognize that nonobservables, though difficult to study and even more difficult to make accessible to others, lose important qualities if they are transformed into narrowly defined observables. Researchers use whatever methods work to get at those important qualities and truths, <i>manifesting the belief that truth depends on meanings, subjectivity cannot be expunged, and attempting to expunge it results in misrepresentation of truth.</i> | |
| Inclusion criteria | Observable data about nonobservable phenomena (e.g., transcripts) that are kept as close as possible to what is studied (direct interviews of people's experiences), not narrowly or pre-defined, and not assumed to <i>be</i> the unobservable phenomenon in question (e.g., certain responses do not equal depression, though they mean <i>something</i>). Instead, researchers provide justifications for why they think a certain meaning is being conveyed in this data. | |
| Exclusion criteria | Qualitative data when they are transformed into narrowly defined observables (including numbers) whose association with nonobservable meanings are tenuous or thin; the emphasis being on the thin observables themselves where important meanings seem to be lost; meaningful data that are unimportant because they are too ambiguous | |
| Typical exemplar | "life stories of caring exemplars were considerably more optimistic and positive in affective tone than those of brave exemplars" (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 858). | |
| Atypical exemplar | "[I]t cannot be determined from these data whether such recollections represent actual experiences or construals in light of present understandings, but it is revelatory that there were clear intimations of early advantage" (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 857). (<i>researchers consider this useful information—though not evidence—in spite of subjectivity</i>) | |
| Mnemonic | 2 QUANTITATIVE (QUANTITATIVE DATA) | 0.6548 |
| Short description | Data are transformed into numbers and run through statistical tests to obtain numerical outcomes thought to be less subjective than qualitative data. | |
| Detailed description | If numbers seem to be more value free than the phenomena they represent, aggregating those numbers into measures of central tendency and applying statistical procedures designed to minimize bias make the results appear even more value free. .05 means .05 in any language. Thus patterns of quantities are more important than meanings. "[W]hen all subjectivity has been subtracted from the world . . . the really real world remains. And what remains that is really real is the world of | |

| | | |
|----------------------|---|--------|
| | <i>quanta. Think of quanta as all the things that are what they are . . . from . . . no point of view” (Shweder, 1996, p. 177).</i> | |
| Inclusion criteria | First ask, are the numbers used with the intention of making research appear more value free (as in discussions of a study’s verified correlational findings)? Second, do the numbers (especially those resulting from analyses) count more than the meanings they represent? Explicit references to statistical analyses, Likert & other numerical measures, and interrater reliability checks count here. | |
| Key terms | Measure (quantitative), significant, instrument, analysis, reliable, correlation, regression, association (when it refers to a correlational finding in the study—also look for numbers) | |
| Related codes | Method Driven, Universal, Dualism, Observable, Prediction | |
| Exclusion criteria | If a measure is mentioned and there is reason to believe it may <i>not</i> be quantitative, do not code it. Also excluded: numbers used where they do not replace non-numerical meanings; unless there’s a compelling reason, numbers describing participant information | |
| Typical exemplar | “These analyses revealed highly significant differences between the brave and caring exemplars on three personality variables” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 855). | |
| Mnemonic | 2a QUALITATIVE (QUALITATIVE DATA) | N/A |
| Short description | Data are systematically studied in terms of requisite qualitative subjective meanings thought to be more valid than numbers by themselves. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers focus more on the <i>meanings</i> of unobservable phenomena (which involves analyzing what they mean <i>to</i> persons) than on counting and computing observables associated with it (which limit meanings). Meanings may be worth analyzing without limiting them to forms that can be counted and computed. Even to a researcher, .05 is only meaningful inasmuch as there are meanings associated with it, so computations of associated numbers cannot bring data outside the realm of human subjectivity. From this view, “ <i>the objective conception of the real world is partial or incomplete</i> ” (Shweder, 1996, p. 178). | |
| Inclusion criteria | Research emphasis on quality rather than quantity and statistical analysis; numerical representations viewed as inadequate without qualitative meanings; passages of discussion section that emphasize the qualities rather than quantities of the qualitative data | |
| Exclusion criteria | Indications that qualitative data are less valid because of their subjectivity; qualitative data transformed into numbers with the implication that such transformation puts the data outside the realm of human subjectivity | |
| Typical exemplar | “life stories of caring exemplars were considerably more optimistic and positive in affective tone than those of brave exemplars” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 858). | |
| Mnemonic | 3 DUALISM (ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM) | 0.2450 |
| Short description | Researchers treat subjectivity as separable from “facts,” avoiding or marginalizing what they consider subjective. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers aim for knowledge free of subjective influences (e.g., cultural views), assuming dual dimensions of knowledge. Researchers explicate efforts to remove biases (e.g., beliefs, opinions, intuitions introspections), and references to evidence and validity imply that objective (value-free) methods lead to objective (value-free) data. They imply dualism by emphasizing value-free methods that must be followed to obtain value-free data, hoping to avoid saying how things <i>should be</i> in human morality (e.g., being influenced by philosophical positions), but rather how things <i>are</i> (e.g., how they function). | |
| Inclusion criteria | Any concession to the value-free idea: Statements or implications of fact/value distinctions; usually efforts to expunge viewpoints and biases; preference given to methods thought to expunge subjectivity; marginalization of information due to its being value laden or subjective | |
| Key terms | Significance, reliability, control, blind, random assignment, construal, notion, beliefs, values, self-report, bias, prejudice, suggest, support, show, demonstrate, resolve, reveal, evidence, valid, function | |
| Related codes | Universal, Method Driven, Prediction, Quantitative, Observable | |
| Exclusion criteria | If it is Universal, it might <i>not</i> be dualistic if there is no apparent implication that only value-free methods and information are involved in making a statement—for example, introductory material often includes philosophical discussions that imply universality but not dualism. Endorsements of multiple viewpoints and balanced representations of values not endorsing the value-free ideal; instances in which researchers explicate their biases and priorities, even if they attempt to reduce certain types of biases | |
| Example rationale | Universal (but <i>NOT</i> Dualism) – In this passage ideas are stated as universals, but there is no reference to value-free methods to obtain value-free knowledge; it is not clear that value freedom is implied. | |
| Typical exemplar | “these analyses revealed pronounced differences between moral exemplars . . . and ordinary individuals” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 854). | |
| Atypical | “it cannot be determined from these data whether such recollections represent actual experiences or construals in light of present understandings, but it is | |

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| exemplar | revelatory that there were clear intimations of early advantage” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 857). <i>(in context it is apparent the researchers believe other data to “determine” such things)</i> | |
| Mnemonic | 3a HOLISM (ONTOLOGICAL HOLISM) | |
| Short description | Researchers treat subjectivity as inherent in all human “facts,” observations, and understandings; understanding truth requires understanding context. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers manifest belief that subjectivity is inherent in all human knowledge about the world, so efforts to rein in biases should be particular to the aims of research (and explicated as such). Value ladenness may be seen as a good thing, such as when human rights are valued. Whereas no research has ever been shown to not begin with philosophical positions, researchers attempt to examine their own inherent biases and explicate them. Rather than referring to “facts,” they may refer to contextual objectivity and truth, which is not an endorsement of “anything goes” but an attempt to locate truth in its context. “[T]here is no place else, no neutral place, for us to stand” (Shweder, 1991, p. 23). | |
| Inclusion criteria | Explication of inherent biases; indications that findings are interpreted and not definitive (though still useful); explications of contextual reality | |
| Exclusion criteria | Implying the aim to expunge subjectivity in general; including “subjective” information but casting it as less valid; hints that values “creep in” and should be kept out; endorsement of the value-free ideal (In order to be assigned this code, a passage would have to explicitly say that biases are inherent and that the researchers are aiming to prevent only certain things from influencing outcomes). | |
| Mnemonic | 4 METHOD DRIVEN (METHOD-DRIVEN SCIENCE) | 0.3886 |
| Short description | Researchers use and explicate their methods with the implication that these render their evaluations of human moral phenomena value free. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers purport to evaluate human moral phenomena from a value-free perspective. Though any research design will depend somewhat on the topic at hand and most will be constrained at some level by method, this code refers to methods considered to be givens, tried and accepted by the scientific community, that facilitate value free results. Qualitative studies are not automatically topic-driven. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Using a priori established methods to facilitate value-free results: True experiments supposed to establish cause and effect, “blind” studies supposed to keep biases from creeping in, control group, checks to measure construct and other types of validity, interrater reliability, random assignment, replication, measures of significance (p-values), etc.; attempting to correct improper method by using more appropriate established methods; indications that researchers believe their methods to eliminate subjectivity; criticism claiming that studies are biased because they do not employ “correct” procedures aimed at expunging subjectivity; justifications that appeal to value free-methods or value-free data; making an appeal to “good model fit” or other coefficients to justify claims about phenomena; claims that methods worked to show or resolve anything (even very small things); emphasis on predictive power; use of a model of a phenomenon and research based on prediction counts as method-driven | |
| Key terms | Significance, reliable, valid, reveal, predict, analysis, blind, random, control, model fit, replicate, function | |
| Other likely codes | Dualism, Universal, Quantitative, Prediction, Observable, (anything Method-Driven is probably dualistic as well) | |
| Exclusion criteria | Passages where research is cited as “showing” knowledge where the methodism of those studies is unclear; employing some of the above methods for the explicit purpose of a more fair representation (intersubjective agreement) rather than an implication of value freedom; other methods being used and not automatically considered more subjective than these traditional methods; studies in which subjectivity & biases are assumed to be inherent (and are explicated); controls and checks assumed to limit specific biases but not with the idea that all biases should be eliminated. | |
| Typical exemplar | “these analyses revealed pronounced differences between moral exemplars . . . and ordinary individuals” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 854). | |
| Atypical exemplar | “With an aggregated . . . conception of people’s attitudes, . . . the TPB can predict individual intention and behavior with accuracies of 80-90%” (Kaiser, 2006, p. 80). | |
| Mnemonic | 4a TOPIC DRIVEN (TOPIC-DRIVEN METHOD) | |
| Short description | Researchers emphasize how the approach they use facilitates obtaining the particular knowledge they seek <i>and de-emphasize value-free knowledge.</i> | |
| Detailed description | Method is used in service of getting at important truths about a phenomenon that are not necessarily “facts.” A strong case is made for using a particular method to get at a particular phenomenon without emphasizing value freedom. If researchers focus on an approved set of methods for finding “factual” or universal knowledge, this code is probably not going to apply—there may rarely be a section that heavily emphasizes a topic-driven approach. Topic-driven method includes explicating justifications for methods that acknowledge salient researcher values as well as the kinds of biases researchers attempt to avoid—the concern is not value freedom but getting at truth, which may not be universal. Qualitative methods do not automatically fit this description. | |

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| Inclusion criteria | Studies in which method is not set in stone from the outset but adjusted even down to basic assumptions according to the needs of the topic; studies not limiting methods to those thought to facilitate value-free knowledge; findings explicitly acknowledged as interpreted and value laden; strong case made for using a particular method because it gets at the phenomenon of interest rather than because it facilitates value-free knowledge. In rare cases, a topic-driven approach may be heavily emphasized in one section of an otherwise method-driven article. | |
| Exclusion criteria | Studies in which dualistic methodology (aiming for value freedom) upstages consideration of method | |
| Typical exemplar | "They were . . . asked . . . to . . . convey the event's impact and what it says about who they are as persons" (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 849). | |
| Mnemonic | 5 PREDICTION (UNDERSTANDING BY PREDICTION) | 0.2312 |
| Short description | Researchers manifest the belief that understanding truth inherently involves prediction. | |
| Detailed description | Prediction is valued because it is supposed to demonstrate valid truth free of viewpoints. Researchers manifest the hope that their studies will be predictive (and replicable). Knowledge not likely to have predictive value is not considered useful. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Research must exclude the unpredictable (e.g., genuine agency) Passage should also include one or more of these: Research emphasis on hypothesis testing and prediction, especially when claiming that the data support universal principles; suggestions that <i>not</i> predicting is a problem (no discovery of any universal principles); passages that suggest prediction as an aim or an accomplishment | |
| Key terms | Predict, account for, should, explain, test, contribution | |
| Other likely codes | Universal, Method Driven, Dualism, Observable, Quantitative, Mechanistic | |
| Exclusion criteria | Interpretations of predictions that claim no more than general tendencies in populations and emphasize understanding over prediction; research questions not necessarily associated with prediction | |
| Typical exemplar | "it is hypothesized that exemplars will score higher than comparison participants" (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 847). | |
| Atypical exemplar | "it contributed nothing to the prediction of moral action" (Walker & Frimer, p. 852). | |
| Mnemonic | 5a UNDERSTANDING (UNDERSTANDING INDEPENDENT OF PREDICTION) | |
| Short description | Researchers emphasize understanding and manifest the belief that understanding <i>without concern for prediction</i> may be a better approach to getting at truth. | |
| Detailed description | Though researchers recognize prediction's usefulness, they also recognize that the truth about human behaviors may not be entirely predictable. They study human behavior first because they want to understand it and devise methods with this in mind. They may find general tendencies in behaviors that support prediction, but this is not the emphasis of studies. When deciding which of these codes to apply, emphasis and context matter. There must be some indication that at least some of the time prediction is not the most important thing. " <i>Unless we already know a good deal about a person's goals, preferences, beliefs, ethics, and cultural meanings, most of our 'universal' generalizations have little predictive power</i> " (Shweder, 1991, p. 270). | |
| Inclusion criteria | Efforts to understand that do not involve prediction; manifestations that absolute prediction is not attainable where agents are involved; passages where it is apparent that some data are important in their own right for helping researchers to understand phenomena | |
| Exclusion criteria | Admissions of lack of prediction that imply more research is needed to adequately predict; studies in which "understanding" inherently means being able to predict | |
| Mnemonic | 6 UNIVERSAL (UNIVERSALITY) | 0.0694 |
| Short description | Explanations about behavior and behavioral research are cast in terms of context-free principles that do not change. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers aim to produce universals that are reliable across contexts, obviously free of subjectivity. Even if they are refined to a detailed level, statements in reports manifest the aim to discover universal principles that predict and do not change. The more generally a principle can be shown to apply, the more valued it is. Acknowledged limitations and calls for more research to discover specific criteria imply the aim to produce more refined and universal statements. When authors speak of theories, almost always they are speaking in terms of universality. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Implications that findings or phenomena should always be the case across contexts (detailed variables can be known and should always produce the same result); indications of efforts toward universal applications of principles; seeking universal and unchanging answers; implications that theories apply universally and should be refined until they reflect universal principles. Look for passages in which the researchers make present-tense global statements about the way | |

things are. If it implies that the best explanation ultimately ends in natural selection, it implies Universality.

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| Key terms | If results suggest, demonstrate, reveal, show, or the researchers find valid evidence, it is probably an implication of universality | |
| Other likely codes | If it implies Natural Rationality or Natural Types, it implies Universality. If it is coded with Dualism or Methodism, it is usually but not always also Universal. Predictions are usually meant universally. | |
| Exclusion criteria | Some passages may be excluded from this code because apparently the researchers are only referring to what happened in one case, even if they make universal statements elsewhere. There also may be interpretations that make allowance for particular differences and contexts that do not depend on universal principles. | |
| Typical exemplar | "we present a multifaceted view of national identification and test the hypothesis that different modes of identification have opposing relations to feelings of group-based guilt" (Roccas, Klar, & Leviatan, 2006, p. 698). | |
| Mnemonic | 6a CONTEXTUAL (CONTEXTUALITY) | |
| Short description | Explanations about behavior are cast in terms of particular contexts that may not recur. | |
| Detailed description | While phenomena exclusive to particular contexts do not lend themselves to establishing reliability, researchers study them with the belief that both may be important sources of truth. Though such truth may be useful in understanding other contexts, it is not considered to be reducible to unchanging principles. "Unless we already know a good deal about a person's goals, preferences, beliefs, ethics, and cultural meanings, most of our 'universal' generalizations have little predictive power" (Shweder, 1991, p.270). | |
| Inclusion criteria | Emphasis on particular contexts that may never recur; Interpretations that make allowance for particular differences and contexts that do not depend on universal principles; questioning the existence or prevalence of universals | |
| Exclusion criteria | Implications that explanations including contextual details should be similar in similar contexts; Explications of limitations that imply more details are needed to establish universal principles | |
| II. Understanding morality – What values do moral psychologists manifest regarding how best to conceptualize morality? | | |
| Mnemonic | MECHANISM (MECHANISTIC MORALITY) | 0.2264 |
| Short description | Human morality is best understood in mechanistic rather than meaningful terms. | |
| Detailed description | Morality is discussed in terms of the mechanisms underlying it (parts that interact like gears) to the exclusion of true possibilities. Researchers appear to believe that moral cognitions and behaviors have been explained when the underlying causal mechanisms have been explained. "[Q]uite fantastically and against much evidence, it is conveniently assumed that we can physically enter a transcendent realm where the effects of context, content, and meaning can be eliminated, standardized, or kept under control, and the central processor observed in the raw" (Shweder, 1991, p. 81). | |
| Inclusion criteria | Explanations of moral phenomena in terms of mechanisms that cause them; mention of components of phenomena treated as discrete units that must be triggered, shut down, etc.; indications that explanations <i>require</i> explication of mechanisms responsible for phenomena; statements that attribute human morality to mechanism | |
| Key terms | Dynamics, process, mechanism, function, experiment, trigger, prime, cue, drive, manipulation | |
| Related codes | Natural Rationality, Universal, Dualism, Prediction, Method Driven | |
| Exclusion criteria | Passages that do not mention multiple components or use mechanistic terms; influences of biology and environment construed holistically and not as discrete causal entities | |
| Example rationale | Researchers make room in this passage for the possibility of meaning that is not elsewhere in the article ultimately reduced to mechanisms. | |
| Typical exemplar | "several possible mediating mechanisms . . . explain how intensification of the conflict causes a decrease in group-based guilt" (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 705). | |
| Atypical exemplar | "Glorification suppressed the attachment effect, but not vice versa" (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 698). | |
| Mnemonic | 7a MEANING (MEANINGFUL MORALITY) | N/A |
| Short | Human morality is best understood in terms of contextual and intentional meanings that are not reducible to mechanisms. | |

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| description | | |
| Detailed description | Researchers manifest the belief that the meanings of intentional moral behaviors and the constraints of biology and environment on them are not reducible to mechanisms—that trying to reduce them in this way results in distortions and misrepresentations of the truth. Understanding human meanings within contexts is necessary for understanding human moral behaviors. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Explanations that cast morality in ultimately and genuinely meaningful terms, using “mechanistic” words only metaphorically; explanations that consider context as essential for understanding components of moral meanings and do not reduce them to mechanisms | |
| Example rationale | Researchers make room in this passage for the possibility of meaning that is not elsewhere in the article ultimately reduced to mechanisms. | |
| Exclusion criteria | Explanations that use meaningful terms that ultimately imply non-meaningful mechanisms that cause phenomena associated with morality; components of phenomena treated as discrete units that must be triggered, shut down, etc. and whose synthesis can add up to the phenomena themselves | |
| Typical exemplar | “a dynamic self-narrative better reflects how individuals work out a sense of identity and fashion a meaningful place in the psychosocial world” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 856). <i>(the authors are unclear as to whether or not such “work[ing] out” is reducible to mechanisms, so the possibility of meaningful morality exists here)</i> | |
| Mnemonic | 8 NATURAL TYPES (REIFIED NATURAL BOUNDARIES) | 0.1794 |
| Short description | Human morality is best understood in terms of types that occur naturally. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers specify valued classifications associated with human morality and the universal boundaries between different types as if they were “out there, fixed in reality, waiting to be discovered by means of . . . correlational analysis” (Shweder, 1991, p. 184). This naturalness is reified by factor analyses and in other ways, such as when many researchers study the same “types”, confirming that they are valid natural distinctions rather than evidence of the values of researchers and their cultures. Even if researchers aver that such types vary by culture, they use value-free methods to show us which types people value, in essence, reifying them as universal. | |
| Inclusion criteria | The following are included (but not if the researchers explicitly state that the findings only reflect what is important to specific people): Efforts to demonstrate the natural boundaries between two or more constructs; distinctions that imply universality or scientificity of boundaries; indicating the necessity of establishing such universality or clarity of boundaries; factor and other analyses used to show categories are valid; citing a history of research confirming valid distinctions (or those needing refinement); causal theories cast in terms of such “natural” distinctions; suggestions that “good model fit” and other results support the distinctions; appeal to cross-cultural studies that further support such distinctions; attributions of distinct types to predisposition by underlying biological substrates. Even if researchers within an article indicate that the types they are studying are culturally defined and there are other ways to approach them, they may still present findings as if they support a natural delineation. | |
| Key terms | Factor, analysis, distinct, model, significant, discrete, differ | |
| Related codes | Universal, Method Driven, Dualism, Quantitative, Prediction, Observable | |
| Exclusion criteria | Emphasizing that boundaries are delineated intentionally and according to cultural values | |
| Typical exemplar | “These analyses revealed highly significant differences between the brave and caring exemplars on three personality variables” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 855). | |
| Mnemonic | 8a INTENTIONAL TYPES (INTENTIONALLY PURPOSED BOUNDARIES) | |
| Short description | Boundaries delineating “types” are treated as existing because they play a part in genuine human purposes (what genuinely matters to humans). | |
| Detailed description | Researchers manifest recognition that since differences in phenomena associated with human behavior are innumerable and could be construed in innumerable ways, boundaries placed to delineate “types” are purposeful rather than universal, revealing what is important and valued subjectively, including the subjectivity inherent in the knowledge-seeking culture of people that study natural differences. Specific questions used in measures that are later analyzed reflect what is important. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Indications that boundaries are delineated intentionally and according to cultural values | |
| Exclusion criteria | Researcher classifications that give lip service to intentionality but in context do not make plain the importance of the cultural and value basis of the boundaries | |
| Mnemonic | 9 NATURAL RATIONALITY | 0.4108 |
| Short description | Human morality is assumed to be based in natural (universal) individual cognitive and emotive processes. | |

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| Detailed description | Researchers explain all human behavior in terms of exclusively natural (universally governed) rationality, usually in terms of ultimate individual self-interest. Natural rationality is often ultimately directly correlated with utility, or improved likelihood of survival and reproduction for an individual (or the individual's group, which is ultimately in service of the individual); hence, it is ultimately economic and self-interested. <i>"Rationality is . . . a presupposition . . . We assume that behavior is rational and then use the concept of rationality as a criterion to decide how much we need to know in advance of our explanations. . . . For example, . . . With respect to what can phobic, compulsive, and hysterical behavior be seen as rational"</i> (Shweder, 1991, p. 296-7)? | |
| Inclusion criteria | Implications that universal principles (usually based in ultimate self-interest) govern moral cognition, reason, and rationality, and their development in individuals; assumptions that morality is best understood in terms of discrete individual rationality as it is influenced by the environment; explanations of what helps or hinders good outcomes of natural rationality; statements implying clear distinctions between emotive/intuitive and rational processes; implications that one behavior or way of thinking is more naturally rational than others; indications that people should be rational (implying the naturalness of rationality). | |
| Key terms | Process, dynamics, self, adapt, rational, utility, construal, appraisal, motivation, individual, self-interest, function, self-consistency, cognition, reason, emotive | |
| Related codes | Universal, Mechanistic Morality, Better World, Natural Harm | |
| Exclusion criteria | Passages that may imply but do not mention such things as cognition, rationality, or reasoning and do not <i>directly</i> imply them; statements that imply cultural meanings of rationality; implication that cognition is not governed by universal principles | |
| Typical exemplar | "This makes people who are strongly attached to their in-group particularly vulnerable to feeling morally responsible and distressed when exposed to possibly incriminating information on the group's infractions" (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 700). | |
| Atypical exemplar | "several possible mediating mechanisms . . . explain how intensification of the conflict causes a decrease in group-based guilt" (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 705). | |
| Mnemonic | 9a SITUATED RATIONALITY | N/A |
| Short description | "Rational" thinking and behavior in humans is considered to be inextricable from culture (broadly defined) and genuine meaning. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers believe the boundaries defining rationality are fluid and fuzzy and depend on situatedness as true agents both constrained and enabled by biology and culture—and that this does not boil down exclusively to natural selection. Thinking and behavior, though perhaps universal in some respects, is thought to be inextricable from culture (broadly defined). Researchers are open to many types of rationality and fuzzy boundaries around definitions of rational, emotive, and intuitive, which are not necessarily exclusive of one another. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Indications that rationality is cultural, intuitive, emotive, and agentic; suggestions that what is termed pre-logical thought may in some cases be better than what is called rational thought; suggestions that what is considered universal natural rationality may not tell the whole story | |
| Exclusion criteria | Indications that intuitive processes are always present but that rationality (construed as natural and not cultural) is superior, leading to better outcomes; implications that rational thought is superior to intuition. If authors do not suggest that genuine agency is part of the situationality, do not use this code. | |
| III. Good & bad | – What values do moral psychologists manifest regarding how people <i>should</i> and <i>should not be</i> ? | |
| Mnemonic | 10 HARM (NATURAL HARM) | 0.4072 |
| Short description | Researchers' values concerning what is harmful and not harmful to humans inform their conceptualization of morality. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers implicitly assume the boundaries they assign to "harm" (or what is bad for humans) to be naturally and universally important. These assumptions are often related to ideas about morality. Boundaries include some types of physiological, psychological, and economic impairment associated with terms such as justice, well-being, rights, and protection. Researchers may not define or use the term "harm," but still imply a natural definition. These boundaries also <i>exclude</i> items that are <i>not</i> thought to be harmful. Though researchers may suggest that different cultures have different subjective meanings of harm and not harm, researchers' ideas of harm and not harm are not thought of as subjective. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Discussions that include the idea of moral violations or anything that should cause guilt because of its causing harm to someone; harm used as a natural category or construct; discussions that imply something universally or objectively harmful or bad for humans; implications that humans should not do certain things considered harmful; implications that some things should naturally cause guilt; suggestions that certain things are naturally <i>not</i> harmful to humans; the "notion" of harm reified as if it were natural either by objective analysis or assumption of some unstated definition. <i>Some</i> discussions about prosociality or helping imply an objective harm. | |
| Key terms | Welfare, pathology, prevention, protection, well-being, marginalization, treatment, guilt, immoral, violation, harm, stress, prosocial, condemnation, detrimental | |

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| Related codes | Universal, Natural Rationality, Better World | |
| Exclusion criteria | Lack of prosociality or moral exemplarity does not necessarily imply harm. From the researcher's perspective, doing nothing may or may not be harming someone, so this implication must be considered in applying this code. Discussions that cast harm, pathology, etc. as culturally-derived value-laden meanings count as cultural harm. | |
| Typical exemplar | "The first three measures assessed the degree to which the rater gained an impression of the deceased person's . . . moral character or immoral character . . . (i.e., kind-unkind, honest-dishonest, . . . just-unjust . . .) (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014, p. 162). | |
| Atypical exemplar | "a trait's relevance as an indicator of others' intentions toward the self, and whether those others are likely to be helpful or harmful, may not tell the whole story" (Goodwin et al., 2014, p. 165). (<i>using the term harm implies more than merely what that individual is concerned about—the term means something that should not happen</i>) | |
| Mnemonic | 10a CULTURAL HARM | N/A |
| Short description | Researchers manifest the belief that what counts as harmful or not is inextricable from cultural values and meanings. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers construe the term "harm" or related constructs as cultural ideas, though not ruling out the idea that some aspects of what is considered bad for humans may be universally shared. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Indications that harm is culturally defined and always depends on what is valued | |
| Exclusion criteria | Implying that "harm" defined is universally understood or that its meaning is natural | |
| Mnemonic | 11 BETTER WORLD | 0.2734 |
| Short description | Researchers manifest assumptions about what people should and should not be like, implying that some ways of being are better than others. | |
| Detailed description | Researchers often manifest preferences for better ways of being human over worse ways of being human; discussing prosociality or harm is a direct indication of values about how people would be to make a better world. Even if it is only in bringing a certain idea to light so that people may attribute cause where it is due, psychologists also often manifest a desire to help facilitate making the world better. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Indications that researchers think people should be concerned and care for others (within prescribed limits of liberal individual tradition); discussions referencing prosociality (and sometimes morality when equated with prosociality); implications that people should help, do no harm to others, overcome naturally selfish tendencies, be peaceable and not severely judgmental (this last also belongs to liberality); implications that psychologists want to understand and facilitate helpful (prosocial) behaviors and understand and prevent harmful (antisocial) ones; association of antisocial behavior with pathology and problems | |
| Key terms | Justice, well-being, rights, fairness, care, compassion, prosocial, exemplar, good, moral character, responsibility, prejudice, guilt, harm, bad, immoral, violations, ethnocentricity, antisocial, pathology, clinical work, therapy, detrimental, implications that research should/will help understanding | |
| Related codes | Universal, Harm, Natural Rationality | |
| Exclusion criteria | Using the term "moral" without implying or suggesting that people should or should not be some specified way | |
| Typical exemplar | "these obituary data provide further support for the important role that moral character information plays in person perception" (Goodwin et al., 2014, p. 165). (<i>the researchers think moral character is important—it's not merely a value-free empirically derived claim</i>) | |
| Atypical exemplar | "The first three measures assessed the degree to which the rater gained an impression of the deceased person's . . . moral character or immoral character . . . (i.e., kind-unkind, honest-dishonest, . . . just-unjust . . .) (Goodwin et al., 2014, p. 162). (<i>these terms actually mean good and bad ways of being</i>) | |
| Mnemonic | 11a ALOOFNESS (EXCLUSIVE SCIENTIFIC CURIOSITY) | N/A |
| Short description | Scientists in the capacity of their research are supposed to manifest no values besides the desire to discover value-free knowledge and employ methods for doing it. | |
| Detailed description | Science is supposed to reflect only epistemic values, such as a desire for value-free knowledge and valuing methods for discovering it. Other values (such as caring about the way people feel or behave) are considered nonscientific. | |
| Inclusion criteria | Indications that there are no better or worse ways of being human. | |
| Exclusion criteria | Attempts to manifest aloof scientific curiosity when anything in the article implies a better or worse way of being human | |
| Dominant Code Total Interrater Reliability | | 0.3032 |

*Codes with two few hits to calculate a meaningful kappa are designated N/A; blank cells refer to zero coded passages for a code

TABLE A3 – INTERRATER RELIABILITY DATA SUMMARY

a = agreement to apply code; b = doc 1 yes, doc 2 no; c = doc 1 no, doc 2 yes; d = agreement to not apply code; number of units in parentheses; empty cells mean no units in the article were coded with this code; N/A means there were not enough coded cells to calculate a meaningful kappa

| Code | Aquino (106) | | | | Cushman (30) | | | | Gray (87) | | | | Horberg (88) | | | | Skitka (130) | | | | Totals (441) | | | | Kappa |
|-------------------------------|--------------|----|----|-----|--------------|----|----|----|-----------|----|----|----|--------------|----|----|----|--------------|----|----|-----|--------------|-----|-----|-----|--------|
| | a | b | c | d | a | b | c | d | a | b | c | d | a | b | c | d | a | b | c | d | a | b | c | d | |
| 1 OBSERVABLE EVENTS | 53 | 6 | 36 | 11 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 7 | 33 | 9 | 24 | 21 | 40 | 5 | 9 | 34 | 40 | 2 | 63 | 25 | 173 | 26 | 144 | 98 | 0.2494 |
| 2 QUANTITATIVE DATA | 32 | 6 | 10 | 58 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 22 | 29 | 7 | 15 | 36 | 27 | 3 | 4 | 54 | 50 | 2 | 27 | 51 | 143 | 19 | 58 | 221 | 0.6548 |
| 3 ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM | 73 | 7 | 20 | 6 | 20 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 65 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 64 | 7 | 6 | 11 | 102 | 5 | 17 | 6 | 324 | 30 | 60 | 27 | 0.2450 |
| 4 METHOD-DRIVEN | 66 | 6 | 24 | 10 | 14 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 45 | 9 | 17 | 16 | 52 | 5 | 17 | 14 | 82 | 4 | 23 | 21 | 260 | 23 | 89 | 69 | 0.3886 |
| 5 PREDICTION | 48 | 6 | 44 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 10 | 42 | 15 | 18 | 12 | 42 | 9 | 20 | 17 | 61 | 6 | 33 | 30 | 201 | 44 | 118 | 77 | 0.2312 |
| 6 UNIVERSALITY* | 93 | 9 | 4 | 0 | 23 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 78 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 75 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 118 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 387 | 30 | 21 | 5 | 0.0694 |
| 7 MECHANISTIC MORALITY | 70 | 3 | 23 | 10 | 19 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 35 | 6 | 33 | 13 | 20 | 18 | 21 | 29 | 35 | 27 | 19 | 49 | 179 | 55 | 103 | 104 | 0.2264 |
| 8 NATURAL TYPES | 4 | 7 | 36 | 59 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 14 | 16 | 48 | 5 | 18 | 34 | 12 | 14 | 28 | 40 | 9 | 25 | 56 | 94 | 92 | 80 | 175 | 0.1794 |
| 9 NATURAL RATIONALITY | 44 | 15 | 15 | 32 | 24 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 54 | 6 | 16 | 11 | 33 | 21 | 14 | 20 | 60 | 18 | 4 | 48 | 215 | 61 | 52 | 113 | 0.4108 |
| 10 NATURAL HARM | 37 | 9 | 5 | 55 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 11 | 50 | 18 | 8 | 11 | 48 | 29 | 1 | 10 | 27 | 31 | 5 | 67 | 171 | 88 | 28 | 154 | 0.4072 |
| 11 BETTER WORLD | 86 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 15 | 10 | 1 | 4 | 34 | 46 | 4 | 3 | 40 | 37 | 1 | 10 | 34 | 38 | 4 | 54 | 209 | 134 | 17 | 81 | 0.2734 |
| 1a NONOBSERVABLE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2a QUALITATIVE DATA | 2 | 1 | 0 | 104 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 86 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 87 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 125 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 431 | N/A |
| 3a ONTOLOGICAL HOLISM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4a TOPIC-DRIVEN METHOD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5a UNDERSTANDING | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6a CONTEXTUALITY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7a MEANINGFUL MORALITY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | 2 | 0 | 128 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 128 | N/A |
| 8a INTENTIONAL TYPES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9a SITUATED RATIONALITY | | | | | | | | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 86 | | | | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 129 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 215 | N/A |
| 10a CULTURAL HARM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | 14 | 0 | 116 | 0 | 14 | 1 | 116 | N/A |
| 11a ALOOFNESS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | 30 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 100 | N/A |
| Kappa mean for dominant codes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.3032 |

*code has 2 unit coding error for Gray

TABLE A4 – FREQUENCY TABLE

1st coder's data are used; codes with no hits are not listed; blank cells have no hits

| Code | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 1a | 2a |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|
| Author (number of units) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1-Graham (77) | 60 | 48 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 74 | 16 | 66 | 29 | 37 | 38 | | |
| 2-Cushman (30) | 19 | 7 | 22 | 22 | 12 | 26 | 26 | | 27 | 18 | 16 | | 1 |
| 3-Tybur (95) | 64 | 48 | 66 | 66 | 65 | 86 | 54 | 77 | 47 | 22 | 22 | | |
| 4-Aquino (106) | 89 | 42 | 93 | 90 | 92 | 97 | 93 | 40 | 59 | 42 | 93 | | 1 |
| 5-Schnall (21) | 18 | 10 | 17 | 18 | 15 | 12 | 18 | | 11 | 11 | 11 | | |
| 6-Sachdeva (32) | 16 | 5 | 20 | 21 | 19 | 26 | 26 | | 20 | 25 | 28 | | |
| 7-Leach (107) | 73 | 55 | 93 | 89 | 75 | 82 | 52 | 71 | 26 | 2 | 91 | | |
| 8-Valdesolo (7) | 6 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 7 | | 7 | 7 | 6 | | |
| 9-Eskine (20) | 15 | 6 | 18 | 16 | 17 | 20 | 19 | 8 | 15 | 6 | 9 | | |
| 10-Horberg (88) | 49 | 31 | 70 | 69 | 62 | 76 | 41 | 48 | 47 | 49 | 41 | | |
| 11-Hutcherson (95) | 47 | 35 | 66 | 64 | 58 | 92 | 36 | 78 | 34 | 13 | 9 | 3 | 9 |
| 12-Lammers (38) | 26 | 17 | 34 | 34 | 29 | 35 | 28 | 1 | 6 | 26 | 27 | | |
| 13-Moore (34) | 26 | 16 | 28 | 28 | 34 | 21 | 23 | 6 | 23 | 26 | 25 | | |
| 14-Skitka (130) | 103 | 77 | 119 | 105 | 94 | 126 | 54 | 65 | 64 | 32 | 38 | | 4 |
| 15-Jordan (58) | 43 | 20 | 55 | 54 | 49 | 58 | 55 | | 39 | 53 | 55 | | |
| 16-Lee (9) | 8 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 9 | | 1 | 5 | 6 | | |
| 17-Feinberg (39) | 25 | 19 | 32 | 31 | 29 | 35 | 15 | 28 | 12 | 31 | 32 | | 6 |
| 18-Shu (88) | 51 | 30 | 66 | 66 | 62 | 75 | 61 | | 37 | 72 | 71 | | |
| 19-Janoff-Bulman (104) | 41 | 25 | 57 | 55 | 52 | 96 | 55 | 93 | 72 | 37 | 52 | | 4 |
| 20-Zhong (26) | 18 | 9 | 22 | 19 | 17 | 23 | 23 | | 17 | 20 | 18 | | |
| 21-Conway (77) | 72 | 51 | 69 | 67 | 60 | 73 | 61 | 59 | 65 | 55 | 56 | | |
| 22-Gray (87) | 57 | 44 | 80 | 62 | 60 | 83 | 68 | 21 | 70 | 58 | 38 | | |
| 23-Helzer (29) | 25 | 15 | 26 | 25 | 22 | 24 | 24 | 7 | 13 | 14 | 14 | | |
| 24-Wakslak (37) | 32 | 24 | 31 | 31 | 32 | 34 | 26 | | 17 | 15 | 30 | | |
| 25-Heflick (68) | 62 | 20 | 60 | 60 | 59 | 63 | 48 | | 40 | 41 | 39 | | 1 |
| Column totals (1502) | 104 | 662 | 1216 | 1164 | 1072 | 1363 | 938 | 668 | 803 | 712 | 865 | 3 | 26 |
| | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Note: Code numbers refer to codes as follows: 1 = Observable events, 2 = Quantitative data, 3 = Dualism, 4 = Method-driven, 5 = Prediction, 6 = Universal, 7 = Mechanistic, 8 = Natural Types, 9 = Natural rationality, 10 = Harm, 11 = Better world, 1a = Nonobservable events, 2a = Qualitative data

TABLE A5 – CODING RESULTS

a = agreement to code, b = doc 1 yes, doc 2 no; c = doc 1 no, doc 2 yes; d = agreement to not code; $P(\text{observed}) = a + d/N$; $Kappa = (P[o] - P[\text{expected}])/N - (P[\text{expected}])$

Code 1 – Observable (Kappa = 0.2494)

| Aquino | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|------------|-------|------|----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 53 | b= 6 | 59 |
| | 0 | c= 36 | d=11 | 47 |

K = 0.142 89 17 106

$P(o) = 64/106 = 0.6038$; $P(e) = 0.5384$

Cushman Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 7 | b= 4 | 11 |
| | 0 | c=12 | d= 7 | 19 |

K = 0.004 19 11 30

$P(o) = 14/30 = 0.4667$; $P(e) = 0.4644$

Gray Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a=33 | b= 9 | 42 |
| | 0 | c=24 | d=21 | 45 |

K = 0.249 57 30 87

$P(o) = 54/87 = 0.6207$; $P(e) = .4946$

Horberg Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a=40 | b= 5 | 45 |
| | 0 | c= 9 | d=34 | 43 |

K = 0.681 49 39 88

$P(o) = 74/88 = 0.8409$; $P(e) = 0.5013$

Skitka Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|-------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 40 | b= 2 | 42 |
| | 0 | c= 63 | d=25 | 88 |

K = 0.171 103 27 130

$P(o) = 65/130 = 0.50$; $P(e) = 0.3966$

Code 2 – Quantitative (Kappa = 0.6548)

| Aquino | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|------------|------|------|----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=32 | b= 6 | 38 |
| | 0 | c=10 | d=58 | 68 |

K = 0.678 42 64 106

$P(\text{observed}) = 90/106 = 0.8491$; $P(e) = 0.5294$

Cushman Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|------|-------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 5 | b= 1 | 6 |
| | 0 | c= 2 | d= 22 | 24 |

K = 0.706 7 23 30

$P(o) = 27/30 = 0.90$; $P(e) = 0.66$

Gray Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a=29 | b= 7 | 36 |
| | 0 | c=15 | d=36 | 51 |

K = 0.495 44 43 87

$P(o) = 65/87 = 0.7471$; $P(e) = 0.4990$

Horberg Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a=27 | b= 3 | 30 |
| | 0 | c= 4 | d=54 | 58 |

K = 0.824 31 57 88

$P(o) = 81/88 = 0.9205$

Skitka Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|----------|---|-------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 50 | b= 2 | 52 |
| | 0 | c= 27 | d=51 | 78 |

K = 0.570 77 53 130

$P(o) = 101/130 = 0.7769$; $P(e) = 0.4815$

Code 3 – Dualism (Kappa = 0.2450)

| Aquino | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-------|------|-----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 73 | b= 7 | 80 |
| | 0 | c= 20 | d= 6 | 26 |
| K = 0.172 | | 93 | 13 | 106 |
| P(o) = 79/106 = 0.7453; P(e) = 0.6922 | | | | |

Cushman Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------|-----|----|
| 2 | 1 | a=20 | b=6 | 26 |
| | 0 | c= 2 | d=2 | 4 |
| K = 0.189 | | 22 | 8 | 30 |
| P(o) = 22/30 = 0.7333; P(e) = 0.6711 | | | | |

Gray Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|-------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 65 | b= 5 | 70 |
| | 0 | c= 15 | d= 2 | 17 |
| K = 0.059 | | 80 | 7 | 87 |
| P(o) = 67/89 = 0.7701; P(e) = 0.7556 | | | | |

Horberg Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|-------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 64 | b= 7 | 71 |
| | 0 | c= 6 | d=11 | 17 |
| K = 0.536 | | 70 | 18 | 88 |
| P(o) = 64/88 = 0.8523; P(e) = 0.6813 | | | | |

Skitka Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|--|---|-------|-----|-----|
| 2 | 1 | a=102 | b=5 | 107 |
| | 0 | c= 17 | d=6 | 23 |
| K = 0.269 | | 119 | 11 | 130 |
| P(o) = 108/130 = 0.8308; P(e) = 0.7684 | | | | |

Code 4 – Method driven (Kappa = 0.3886)

| Aquino | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-------|------|-----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 66 | b= 6 | 72 |
| | 0 | c= 24 | d=10 | 34 |
| K = 0.245 | | 80 | 16 | 106 |
| P(o) = 76/106 = 0.7170; P(e) = 0.6251 | | | | |

Cushman Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a=14 | b= 0 | 14 |
| | 0 | c= 8 | d= 8 | 16 |
| K = 0.483 | | 22 | 8 | 30 |
| P(o) = 22/30 = 0.7333; P(e) = 0.4844 | | | | |

Gray Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|-------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 45 | b= 9 | 54 |
| | 0 | c= 17 | d=16 | 33 |
| K = 0.334 | | 62 | 25 | 87 |
| P(o) = 61/87 = 0.7011; P(e) = 0.5513 | | | | |

Horberg Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|------------------------------------|---|-------|------|----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 52 | b= 5 | 57 |
| | 0 | c= 17 | d=14 | 31 |
| K = 0.399 | | 69 | 19 | 88 |
| P(o) = 66/88 = 0.75; P(e) = 0.5839 | | | | |

Skitka Document 1

| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
|--|---|-------|------|-----|
| 2 | 1 | a= 82 | b= 4 | 86 |
| | 0 | c= 23 | d=21 | 44 |
| K = 0.482 | | 105 | 25 | 130 |
| P(o) = 103/130 = 0.7923; P(e) = 0.5994 | | | | |

Code 5 – Prediction (Kappa = 0.2312)

| | | Document 1 | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|-----|-----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a=48 | b=6 | 54 |
| | 0 | c=44 | d=8 | 52 |
| K = 0.043 | | 92 | 14 | 106 |
| P(o) = 56/105 = 0.5283; P(e) = 0.5069 | | | | |

Cushman Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 9 | b= 8 | 17 |
| | 0 | c= 3 | d=10 | 13 |
| K = 0.286 | | 12 | 18 | 30 |
| P(o) = 19/30 = 0.6333; P(e) = 0.4867 | | | | |

Gray Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 42 | b=15 | 57 |
| | 0 | c= 18 | d=12 | 30 |
| K = 0.140 | | 60 | 27 | 87 |
| P(o) = 54/87 = 0.6207; P(e) = 0.5589 | | | | |

Horberg Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 42 | b= 9 | 51 |
| | 0 | c= 20 | d=17 | 37 |
| K = 0.295 | | 62 | 26 | 88 |
| P(o) = 59/88 = 0.6705; P(e) = 0.5325 | | | | |

Skitka Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 61 | b= 6 | 67 |
| | 0 | c= 33 | d=30 | 63 |
| K = 0.392 | | 94 | 36 | 130 |
| P(o) = 91/130 = 0.70; P(e) = 0.5069 | | | | |

Code 6 – Universality (Kappa = 0.0694)

| | | Document 1 | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 93 | b= 9 | 102 |
| | 0 | c= 4 | d= 0 | 4 |
| K = -0.055 | | 97 | 9 | 106 |
| P(o) = 93/106 = 0.8774; P(e) = 0.8838 | | | | |

Cushman Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a=23 | b= 4 | 27 |
| | 0 | c= 3 | d= 0 | 3 |
| K = -0.129 | | 26 | 4 | 30 |
| P(o) = 23/30 = 0.7667; P(e) = 0.7933 | | | | |

Gray Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------|-----|-----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 78 | b=6 | 84 |
| | 0 | c= 5 | d=0 | 5 |
| K = -0.065 | | 83 | 6 | 89* |
| P(o) = 78/89 = 0.8764; P(e) = 0.884 | | | | |
| *coding error (1 point of 88 units) | | | | |

Horberg Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 75 | b=10 | 85 |
| | 0 | c= 1 | d= 2 | 3 |
| K = 0.224 | | 76 | 12 | 88 |
| P(o) = 77/88 = 0.875; P(e) = 0.8388 | | | | |

Skitka Document 1

| | | Document 1 | | |
|--|---|------------|------|-----|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | |
| 2 | 1 | a=118 | b= 1 | 119 |
| | 0 | c= 8 | d= 3 | 11 |
| K = 0.372 | | 126 | 4 | 130 |
| P(o) = 121/130 = 0.9308; P(e) = 0.8898 | | | | |

Code 7 – Mechanistic morality (0.2264)

| Aquino | | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 70 | b= 3 | 73 | |
| | 0 | c= 23 | d=10 | 33 | |
| K = 0.314 | | 93 | 13 | 106 | |
| P(o) = 80/106 = 0.7547; P(e) = 0.6424 | | | | | |

| Cushman | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=19 | b= 1 | 20 | |
| | 0 | c= 7 | d= 3 | 10 | |
| K = -.294 | | 26 | 4 | 30 | |
| P(o) = 22/26 = 0.7333; P(e) = 0.6222 | | | | | |

| Gray | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=35 | b= 6 | 41 | |
| | 0 | c=33 | d=13 | 46 | |
| K = 0.132 | | 68 | 19 | 87 | |
| P(o) = 48/87 = 0.5517; P(e) = 0.4838 | | | | | |

| Horberg | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=20 | b=18 | 38 | |
| | 0 | c=21 | d=29 | 50 | |
| K = 0.105 | | 41 | 47 | 88 | |
| P(o) = 49/88 = 0.5568; P(e) = 0.5046 | | | | | |

| Skitka | | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=35 | b=27 | 62 | |
| | 0 | c=19 | d=49 | 68 | |
| K = 0.287 | | 54 | 76 | 130 | |
| P(o) = 84/130 = 0.6462; P(e) = 0.5039 | | | | | |

Code 8 – Natural types (0.1794)

| Aquino | | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 4 | b= 7 | 11 | |
| | 0 | c=36 | d=59 | 95 | |
| K = -0.007 | | 40 | 66 | 106 | |
| P(o) = 63/106 = 0.5943; P(e) = 0.5972 | | | | | |

| Cushman | | Document 1 | | | |
|--|---|------------|-------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 0 | b= 16 | 16 | |
| | 0 | c= 0 | d= 14 | 14 | |
| K = 0.000 | | 0 | 30 | 30 | |
| P(o) = 14/30 = 0.4667; P(e) = (0.4667) | | | | | |

| Gray | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 16 | b=48 | 64 | |
| | 0 | c= 5 | d=18 | 23 | |
| K = 0.020 | | 21 | 66 | 87 | |
| P(o) = 34/87 = 0.3908; P(e) = 0.3781 | | | | | |

| Horberg | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 34 | b=12 | 46 | |
| | 0 | c= 14 | d=28 | 42 | |
| K = 0.407 | | 48 | 40 | 88 | |
| P(o) = 62/88 = 0.7045; P(e) = 0.5021 | | | | | |

| Skitka | | Document 1 | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 40 | b= 9 | 49 | |
| | 0 | c= 25 | d=56 | 81 | |
| K = 0.477 | | 65 | 65 | 130 | |
| P(o) = 96/130 = 0.7385; P(e) = 0.50 | | | | | |

Code 9 – Natural rationality (Kappa = 0.4108)

| Aquino | | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 44 | b=15 | 59 | |
| | 0 | c= 15 | d=32 | 47 | |
| K = 0.427 | | 59 | 47 | 106 | |
| P(o) = 76/106 = 0.7170; P(e) = 0.5064 | | | | | |

Cushman Document 1

| Cushman | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=24 | b= 1 | 25 | |
| | 0 | c= 3 | d= 2 | 5 | |
| K = 0.429 | | 27 | 3 | 30 | |
| P(o) = 26/30 = 0.8667; P(e) = 0.7667 | | | | | |

Gray Document 1

| Gray | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 54 | b= 6 | 60 | |
| | 0 | c= 16 | d=11 | 27 | |
| K = 0.342 | | 70 | 17 | 87 | |
| P(o) = 65/87 = 0.7471; P(e) = 0.6155 | | | | | |

Horberg Document 1

| Horberg | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=33 | b=21 | 54 | |
| | 0 | c=14 | d=20 | 34 | |
| K = 0.192 | | 47 | 41 | 88 | |
| P(o) = 53/88 = 0.6023; P(e) = 0.5077 | | | | | |

Skitka Document 1

| Skitka | | Document 1 | | | |
|--|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 60 | b=18 | 78 | |
| | 0 | c= 4 | d=48 | 52 | |
| K = 0.663 | | 64 | 66 | 130 | |
| P(o) = 108/130 = 0.8308; P(e) = 0.4985 | | | | | |

Code 10 – Natural Harm (Kappa = 0.4072)

| Aquino | | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 37 | b= 9 | 46 | |
| | 0 | c= 5 | d=55 | 60 | |
| K = 0.728 | | 42 | 64 | 106 | |
| P(o) = 92/106 = 0.8679; P(e) = 0.5137 | | | | | |

Cushman Document 1

| Cushman | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 9 | b= 1 | 10 | |
| | 0 | c= 9 | d=11 | 20 | |
| K = 0.375 | | 18 | 12 | 30 | |
| P(o) = 20/30 = 0.6667; P(e) = 0.4667 | | | | | |

Gray Document 1

| Gray | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 50 | b=18 | 68 | |
| | 0 | c= 8 | d=11 | 19 | |
| K = 0.264 | | 58 | 29 | 87 | |
| P(o) = 61/87 = 0.7011; P(e) = 0.5939 | | | | | |

Horberg Document 1

| Horberg | | Document 1 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=48 | b=29 | 77 | |
| | 0 | c= 1 | d=10 | 11 | |
| K = 0.255 | | 49 | 39 | 88 | |
| P(o) = 58/88 = 0.6591; P(e) = 0.5426 | | | | | |

Skitka Document 1

| Skitka | | Document 1 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------|------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=27 | b=31 | 58 | |
| | 0 | c= 5 | d=67 | 72 | |
| K = 0.414 | | 32 | 98 | 130 | |
| P(o) = 94/130 = 0.7231; P(e) = 0.5273 | | | | | |

Code 11 – Better world (Kappa = 0.2734)

| Aquino | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a= 86 | b= 3 | 89 | |
| | 0 | c= 7 | d=10 | 17 | |

K = 0.613 93 13 106

P(o) = 96/106 = 0.9057; P(e) = 0.7563

| Cushman | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=15 | b=10 | 25 | |
| | 0 | c= 1 | d= 4 | 5 | |

K = 0.233 16 14 30

P(o) = 19/30 = 0.6333; P(e) = 0.5222

| Gray | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=34 | b=46 | 80 | |
| | 0 | c= 4 | d= 3 | 7 | |

K = -0.039 38 49 87

P(o) = 37/87 = 0.4253; P(e) = 0.4470

| Horberg | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=40 | b=37 | 77 | |
| | 0 | c= 1 | d=10 | 11 | |

K = 0.178 41 47 88

P(o) = 50/88 = 0.5682; P(e) = 0.4744

| Skitka | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=34 | b=38 | 72 | |
| | 0 | c= 4 | d=54 | 58 | |

K = 0.382 38 92 130

P(o) = 88/130 = 0.6769; P(e) = 0.4776

Code 2a – Qualitative data

| Aquino | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|-------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=2 | b= 1 | 3 | |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=104 | 104 | |
| | | 2 | 105 | 107 | |

| Cushman | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 0 | 0 | |
| | 0 | c=1 | d=29 | 30 | |
| | | 1 | 29 | 30 | |

| Gray | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 1 | 1 | |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=86 | 86 | |
| | | 0 | 87 | 87 | |

| Horberg | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|------|----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 1 | 1 | |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=87 | 87 | |
| | | 0 | 88 | 88 | |

| Skitka | | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|---|------------|-------|-----|--|
| Document | | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 1 | 1 | |
| | 0 | c=4 | d=125 | 129 | |
| | | 4 | 126 | 130 | |

Code 7a – Meaningful morality

| Skitka | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|------------|-----|-------|-----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 2 | 2 |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=128 | 128 |
| | | 0 | 130 | 130 |

Code 9a – Situated rationality

| Gray | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|------------|-----|------|----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 1 | 1 |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=86 | 86 |
| | | 0 | 87 | 87 |

| Skitka | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|------------|-----|-------|-----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 1 | 1 |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=129 | 129 |
| | | 0 | 130 | 130 |

Code 10a – Cultural harm

| Skitka | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|------------|-----|-------|-----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 14 | 14 |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=116 | 116 |
| | | 0 | 130 | 130 |

Code 11a – Aloofness

| Skitka | Document 1 | | | |
|----------|------------|-----|-------|-----|
| Document | 1 | 0 | | |
| 2 | 1 | a=0 | b= 30 | 30 |
| | 0 | c=0 | d=100 | 100 |
| | | 0 | 130 | 130 |

TABLE A6 – CULTURAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS - MAJOR THEMES

| Related codes | Theme |
|---|--|
| Dualism | While people are always subject to the influence of biases and values, scientific researchers are able to avoid subjective influences to produce objective and value-free knowledge. |
| Method-driven, Better world, Dualism, Prediction | Sound method is supposed to facilitate objective understanding of morality. |
| Dualism, Harm, Better world, Mechanistic, Natural rationality | Researchers avoid “hunches” and provide objective knowledge for understanding the foundations and functions of morality, confirming what is and is not harmful. |
| Mechanistic, Dualism, Natural rationality | Moral judgments are largely irrational. |
| Better world, Harm, Mechanistic, Natural rationality | Some levels of moral thinking are superior to others. Irrational judgments are a problem for society. Some moral judgments are rational and appropriate, while others are subject to strong intuitive influences. Conservatives and liberals are at different stages of moral development. |
| Better world, Natural rationality, Harm, Dualism | Certain highly contested issues such as prostitution, smoking, and casual sex do not pose real danger to others. Many behaviors are harm-free, though they are judged and punished harshly in society. |
| Better world, Harm | If a behavior does not pose real danger to others, judging it harshly is irrational and detrimental. |
| Mechanistic, Harm, Natural rationality | Evolved sensitivity to disgust gives rise to prejudices and harsh judgments. |
| Harm | Those whose moral compasses are guided by not harming others believe killing is wrong regardless of context. |
| Mechanistic, Natural rationality | Behaviors are governed by subjective senses reflecting evolved needs. One of these is the need for self-consistency. Moral behaviors evolved through natural selection. |
| Mechanistic | People are manipulated by environmental triggers to behave in certain ways. |
| Mechanistic, Natural rationality, Better world | Priming with cleanliness reminders, disgusting tastes, moral codes, etc., causes people to change their behaviors. |
| Better world, Harm | Phobias, prejudice, discrimination, inequality, dishonesty, violence, and severe moral judgments are harmful social ills. |
| Better world, Harm | Equality, volunteering, empathic concern, tolerance, and moral outrage against inequality are social goods. |
| Better world, Harm | Clashing political views are problems psychologists hope to illuminate. |
| Better world, Harm, Natural rationality, Natural types | Conservative ideology is more demanding and less rational; liberal ideology is more egalitarian and less harmful. |

TABLE A7 - ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM

The value-free ideal is characterized by objective and unbiased reports, while people's understandings and moral judgments are considered subjective and biased.

| Article | "Objective" assertions of subjectivity | Why is this dualism? |
|--------------------|--|--|
| 1-Graham JPSP | While people frame moral texts according to their values making "policies seem morally good or bad" (p. 1038), content analysis of moral texts is the "most objective approach" to analyzing linguistic data (p. 1039). | People perceive and frame discourse according to their own values, yet scientists are supposed to be able to avoid such subjective perceptions and framing in their research and reports. |
| 2-Cushman PS | Studies provide evidence that intention principle dilemmas are unavailable to conscious reasoning—intuitive judgments lacking complexity (p. 1087). | Sound methods permit researchers to make objective judgments about the nature of subjective moral judgments. |
| 3-Tybur JPSP | Studies reveal that disgust sensitivity shapes many social processes including prejudice, providing critical understanding of "the origin of our emotional responses" (p. 118). | While many social processes are subject to the influence of disgust, researchers avoid such influence to objectively reveal the origins of many behaviors. |
| 4-Aquino JPSP | Researchers are able to predict when "situational factors can be expected to influence moral actions" (p. 138). | People behave as manipulated by environmental triggers, but researchers are able to avoid such triggers in research and reporting. |
| 5-Schnall PS | "[A]ctivating intuitions about cleanliness" reduces "moral condemnation" (p. 1222). | While disgust is largely responsible for moral judgments, researchers' objective reports avoid such irrelevant influences. |
| 6-Sachdeva PS | Researchers provide "direct evidence" that priming people to feel immoral causes altruistic behavior due to the evolved need for a subjective sense of self-consistency (p. 525). | While people's behaviors are governed by subjective senses reflecting evolved needs, researchers are able to avoid subjective senses in their research to produce objective evidence. |
| 7-Leach JPSP | "Because the vast majority of research on the ascription of characteristics to groups has not examined morality, we know very little about its importance to positive evaluation" (p. 235), yet the researchers show that morality is most important to in-group evaluation. | However people feel about the importance of in-group morality, "we know very little" until objective methods reveal such knowledge (p. 235). |
| 8-Valdesolo PS | Competition between automatic cognitive (intuitive) processes and cognitive (deliberative) reasoning leads to "logically [in]appropriate" moral judgments (p. 476). | Moral judgments are subject to intuition, but researchers are able to avoid its influence to produce object knowledge about what is behind "appropriate" moral judgments (p. 476). |
| 9-Eskine PS | Researchers provide "evidence" of the irrelevant influence of disgust (p. 298), showing that morality is merely a matter of taste. | People's judgments are subjective, but researchers avoid such influences on their judgments about what is worth studying or emphasizing to provide objective "evidence" (p. 298). |
| 10-Horberg JPSP | Society's punishments and sanctions are based on subjective hunches about what is morally wrong, even when behaviors are "harm-free" (p. 965). | Researchers avoid "hunches" and provide objective knowledge for understanding the foundations and functions of morality, confirming what is and is not harmful. |
| 11-Hutcherson JPSP | Researchers expect future studies to "elaborate the necessary and sufficient appraisals that elicit [the other-condemning] emotions" (p. 733), explaining "the adaptive role that emotions play in relations between individuals, groups, and cultures" (p. 720). | Sound research enables scientists to objectively ascertain "necessary and sufficient" conditions, including the emotions that govern social behaviors. Though science is a social enterprise, it is able to produce objective knowledge. |

| | | |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| 12-Lammers PS | Researchers induce a sense of power and turn participants into moral hypocrites, demonstrating “inequality-reinforcing processes” (p. 743). | People are cast as if continually subject to influences governing their behaviors and judgments, yet researchers are able to produce objective knowledge uninfluenced by “a sense of power.” |
| 13-Moore PS | “Hot” processes that “[bias] against responding in a way that causes harm” (p. 550) compete with deliberative cognitive processes in moral judgments. | Researchers are able to escape subjective biases in demonstrating objective explanations about moral judgments. |
| 14-Skitka JPSP | People believe their own versions of morality are universal, while their justifications for action are actually blind to “facts” (p. 896). | Sound method is supposed to facilitate objective “social psychological understanding of morality” (p. 915). |
| 15-Jordan PSPB | Moral behavior predictably “fluctuates over time as a function of self-perception of the current completeness of the moral self” (p. 710). | Researchers, ostensibly freed by methods from subjective perceptions, can predict and objectively explain moral behaviors. |
| 16-Lee PS | Participants induced to lie by email were willing to pay more for hand sanitizer, while those who lied by voicemail were willing to pay more for mouthwash (p. 1423). | While people’s behaviors are predictable and manipulable, researchers using sound methods are able to avoid subjectivity in their research. |
| 17-Feinberg PS | Changing the framing of issues manipulates more support for pro-environmental messages. | While the framing of an issue governs people’s perceptions, researchers are able to avoid such framing influences to produce objective knowledge. |
| 18-Shu PSPB | “Determinants of honesty do not lie completely within the individual” (p. 344). People naturally “categorize their own actions in positive terms, thereby avoiding the need to negatively update their moral self-image” (p. 333). | Researchers are able to produce not only honest, but objective knowledge in their research, avoiding the “determinants” grounded outside of the individual and in needs for subjective self-perceptions. |
| 19-Janoff-Bulman JPSP | “Organisms attuned to bad outcomes would be more likely to survive, because there are greater consequences of ignoring harmful, dangerous outcomes than positive outcomes” (p. 524). | While evolution dictates the subjective perceptual nature of moral systems, the researchers are able to avoid such subjectivity and objectively demonstrate the superiority of the prescriptive over the proscriptive system. |
| 20-Zhong JESP | Discrimination stems from evolved subjective perceptions, but “there are social behaviors while different, engender no real danger to others” (p. 861). | Researchers avoid subjective perceptions to assert what counts as “real danger to others” (p. 861). |
| 21-Conway JPSP | Mathematical equations capture each element of the judgment process to predict how people will respond in specific dilemmas. | Though judgments are subjective, objective and value-free mathematical equations render them predictable. |
| 22-Gray JPSP | “[I]n the mind of the perceiver, a villain cannot suddenly transform into a victim, nor can someone categorized as a benefactor easily change into a beneficiary” (p. 507). | Sound methods allow researchers to be disinterested observers rather than subjective perceivers in order to produce objective knowledge about moral perceptions. |
| 23-Helzer PS | “[H]ypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior stem from irrelevant cues (p. 517). | While evaluations are subject to irrelevant influences, researchers find objective “evidence of a deep link between physical purity and moral judgment” (p. 517). |
| 24-Wakslak PS | Passive exposure to system justification reduces feelings of inequality-related distress, while moral outrage predicts support for redistribution. | Researchers are able to avoid subjective influences to objectively demonstrate how attitudes are governed by subjective perceptions of external cues. |
| 25-Heflick JESP | When induced to focus on appearance, women, but not men, are perceived as lower in warmth, competence, and morality. | Researchers avoid subjective perceptions to demonstrate how subjective perceptions that objectify women are manipulable. |

TABLE A8 - MORAL PROBLEMS

| Article | Moral problems | Suggestions for alleviating moral problems |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| 1-Graham JPSP | America's intractable "culture war" makes it difficult to get along. | |
| 2-Cushman PS | Moral judgments governed by automatic processes could be problematic. | |
| 3-Tybur JPSP | Social costs of evolved spandrel-like qualities of disgust include phobias and prejudice. | |
| 4-Aquino JPSP | All humans act both morally and immorally as determined by environmental situations. | "[H]aving salient situational cues available" (p. 139) could help people maintain access to their moral identity. |
| 5-Schnall PS | Disgust leads people to make unduly severe moral judgments of behaviors that are not legitimately harmful. | "[A]ctivating intuitions about cleanliness" may reduce the severity of moral judgments (p. 1222). |
| 6-Sachdeva PS | People behave both morally and immorally as governed by principles of maintaining a comfortable moral self-image. | People should practice "costly" moral behaviors until they become automatic (p. 528). |
| 7-Leach JPSP | Misunderstanding the importance of in-group morality could be problematic for understanding intergroup relations. | |
| 8-Valdesolo PS | Ethical choice often does not stem from deliberative analysis but rather from competing automatic processes. | Inducing a positive affect "optimizes" a decision in which negative intuitions must be overcome (p. 477). |
| 9-Eskine PS | Disgust influences harsh judgments about moral behaviors. | Perhaps jurors should "avoid overly bitter or sweet foods as they deliberate a verdict" (p. 298). |
| 10-Horberg JPSP | Amplification of moral judgments elicited by disgust results in condemnation of purity violations that are not legitimately harmful. | Framing issues that cross moral domains in terms of freedom and rights rather than purity would reduce disgust and moralization. |
| 11-Hutcherson JPSP | Evolved emotions may be associated with "prejudice toward the most stigmatized, dehumanized minorities" (p. 723). | |
| 12-Lammers PS | The powerful engage in moral hypocrisy, while the powerless engage in hypercrisis, helping to maintain inequality. | Tainting the reputations of the powerful may inspire them to "bring their behavior back to their espoused standards" (p. 743). |
| 13-Moore PS | Moral dilemma responses subject to emotional "biases against responding in a way that causes harm" (p. 550) could be problematic. | |
| 14-Skitka JPSP | Besides being irrational, moral convictions are potentially dangerous and associated with horrific behaviors. | |
| 15-Jordan PSPB | Moral licensing causes people to act immorally. | |
| 16-Lee PS | Irrelevant triggers governing moral judgments could be problematic. | |
| 17-Feinberg PS | Environmental issues are plagued by poor communication between political groups. | Reframing environmental discourse in terms of purity could "reduce the gap" between conflicting groups (p. 56). |
| 18-Shu PSPB | Not only are people often dishonest, but they often self-justify and morally disengage, leading to further dishonesty. | "[S]igning a moral code can completely eliminate dishonesty" (p. 344). |
| 19-Janoff-Bulman JPSP | Proscriptive morality regulating "lifestyle" behaviors is less conducive to a moral society. | Emphasizing a prescriptive over a proscriptive moral system will result in dispositional morality over strict self-regulation. |
| 20-Zhong JESP | Irrelevant cues cause discrimination and prejudice against those who engage in behaviors that are not legitimately harmful. | |
| 21-Conway JPSP | Misunderstanding the competing nature of multiple processes in moral judgments could be problematic. For example, utilitarian judgments may be cast as antithetical to empathic concern. | |
| 22-Gray JPSP | Subjective perceptions of moral agency and patiency result in inappropriate help and harm. | "[A] particularly effective technique for many purposes of self-presentation would be casting oneself as a moral patient" (p. 519). |
| 23-Helzer PS | Common reminders of physical cleanliness lead to "hypervigilant" moral evaluations of sexual behavior (p. 517). | |
| 24-Wakslak PS | People maintain the legitimacy of inequality through system justification and the ineffective nature of inward focused guilt. | Moral outrage should be sustained to facilitate efforts against an unjust system. |
| 25-Heflick JESP | A society that emphasizes the appearance of women facilitates their dehumanization. | |

TABLE A9 - HARM AND NOT HARM

| Article | Potentially harmful | Not legitimately harmful |
|-----------------------|---|--|
| 1-Graham JPSP | killing, racism, fascism, blind obedience, stigma, blood feuds, selfishness, inequality & its acceptance | “many issues related to food, sex, clothing, prayer, and gender roles [treated] as moral issues even when they involve no harm to any person” (p. 1030) |
| 2-Cushman PS | death – more is worse than less, regardless of action, contact, or intention | |
| 3-Tybur JPSP | clinical disorders, compulsions, & phobias, prejudice, ethnocentrism, social exclusion, stigma & responses to it, social costs of disgust-induced moral judgments, irrational motivations to punish norm-violators, lying, cheating, stealing | |
| 4-Aquino JPSP | selfishness, lying, barbarism, self-condemnation | |
| 5-Schnall PS | severe moral judgments made by incidental & irrelevant intuitions against “moral transgressions that go beyond principles of harm or fairness” (p. 1222) | “moral transgressions that go beyond principles of harm or fairness” (p. 1222) |
| 6-Sachdeva PS | moral licensing, cheating, not cooperating with others toward the good of the environment, administering shocks, disloyalty, greed, meanness, selfishness, prejudice, sexism, racism, taking advantage of the poor | |
| 7-Leach JPSP | dishonesty, insincerity | |
| 8-Valdesolo PS | death—more is worse than less regardless of action, contact, or intention | |
| 9-Eskine PS | irrational harsh moral judgments | |
| 10-Horberg JPSP | irrational condemnation and severe punishment of purity violations such as casual sex | “eating a small cloned strip of one’s own muscle tissue” (p. 965), “having sex with a dead chicken” (p. 966) |
| 11-Hutcherson JPSP | prejudice toward the most stigmatized, dehumanized minorities, embezzling from a bank, faking an injury to collect on insurance, putting cyanide in a yogurt container at a supermarket | |
| 12-Lammers PS | moral hypocrisy, cheating, social inequality, entitlement, moral hypercrisy | |
| 13-Moore PS | death – more is worse than less regardless of action, contact, or intention | |
| 14-Skitka JPSP | moral convictions, violence, intolerance, maximum moral engagement, deep moral cleavages, cognitive inflexibility, resisting counterfactual reasoning | |
| 15-Jordan PSPB | cheating, moral licensing, sexism, racism, a salient state moral self-image | |
| 16-Lee PS | lying, avoiding contact with morally tainted people | |
| 17-Feinberg PS | not caring about the environment | |
| 18-Shu PSPB | dishonesty, self-justification, moral disengagement, standing by when another commits atrocious acts, cheating on a spouse, dehumanizing victims, insulting another person, abusing a controlled substance, morally lenient environments | |
| 19-Janoff-Bulman JPSP | proscriptive moral systems, harshness and condemnation | legal abortion, stem cell research, gay marriage (at least these should not cause great concern) |
| 20-Zhong JESP | irrational discrimination and prejudice stemming from the “potential unintended consequences of cleanliness”, severe moral judgments “on morally contested issues such as abortion and pornography” (p. 859). | abortion, adultery, alcoholic, casual sex, recreational drug use, wearing animal fur, homosexuality, littering, masturbation, obesity, pollution, pornography, premarital sex, profane language, prostitution, and smoking (survey items of “social behaviors [that] engender no real danger to others” (p. 862) |
| 21-Conway JPSP | stereotypes, racism, violence, death, acceptance of harm (pitted against genuine moral concern, p. 228) | |
| 22-Gray JPSP | killing, stealing, violence, bodily injury, not caring for the environment, unfairness, possibly unfair allocation of harm and help | |
| 23-Helzer PS | unintended effects of cleanliness reminders, irrational “hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior” | “violations of sexual purity” (p. 517): homosexuality, abortion, pornography, masturbation, brother-sister sex, etc. |
| 24-Wakslak PS | inequality, system-justification, privilege, impoverishment, suffering, victimization | |
| 25-Heflick JESP | dehumanization, objectification, appearance focus, social inequality between sexes | |

TABLE A10 - CONSERVATIVE VS. LIBERAL MORALITY

| Article | Conservative Ideology | Liberal Ideology |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| 1-Graham JPSP | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -uniquely associated with “the binding foundations,” which can “motivate horrific behavior” (p. 1040) -Ingroup/loyalty—related to racism -Authority/respect—related to fascism, blind obedience -Purity/sanctity—related to stigma -“constrained vision” -authority, institutions, and traditions needed to live civilly (pp. 1029-1030) -pessimistic view of human nature & human imperfectability -“preference for things that are familiar, stable, and predictable” -“suppress selfishness by strengthening groups and institutions -binding individuals into roles and duties (p. 1030) -“ethic of community”—moral goods such as obedience, duty, interdependence, cohesiveness of institutions -“ethic of divinity”—purity, sanctity, and the suppression of humanity’s baser, more carnal instincts -“positional ideology” -“reaction” to challenges -“stronger emotional sensitivity to threats to the social order”; limiting liberties in defense of that order -“loyalty, patriotism, and self-sacrifice for the group, combined with an extreme vigilance for traitors” (p. 1031) -“the two core aspects of conservative ideology are resistance to change and acceptance of inequality” (p. 1030) -“treat many issues as moral issues . . . even when they involve no harm to any person” (p. 1030) -“the political right includes libertarians and “laissez-faire” conservatives who prize individual liberty as essential to the functioning of the free market” | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -uniquely associated with “the individualizing foundations” of morality (p. 1040) -Harm/care -Fairness/reciprocity—related to justice & blood feuds -“unconstrained vision” – people should be left as free as possible to pursue personal development” (p. 1029), -optimistic view of human nature & human perfectibility -“open to experience”, “inclined to seek out change and novelty” -manage selfishness by teaching individuals to respect the rights of others -“ethics of autonomy” (p. 1030) -“reciprocal altruism” -“ethic of care” -“ethic of justice” -“emphasis on the rights and welfare of individuals”(p. 1031) -“The political left has sometimes been associated with socialism and communism, positions that privilege the welfare of the group over the rights of the individual and that have at times severely limited individual liberty.” |
| 9-Eskine PS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -more vulnerable than liberals” to the influence of “extraneous emotions” (p. 298); more associated with irrational harsh judgments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -moral processing less vulnerable to influence of extraneous emotions |
| 10-Horberg JPSP | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -associated with disgust, moralization of the purity domain, condemnation of violators -inducing disgust strengthens irrational, harmful harsh judgments about behaviors that do not involve harm | |
| 17-Feinberg PS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -at a different “stage of moral development” so environmental message must be reframed to “improve communication between opposing sides” (p. 61) -less concerned about the environment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -in line with proenvironmental attitudes -perceive environmental issues as moral issues |
| 19-Janoff-Bulman JPSP | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -associated with blame-worthy proscriptive lifestyle issues & self-monitoring -less conducive to a moral society | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -associated with the credit-worthy prescriptive equity issues and positive obligations and activation -likely to lead to a more moral society |
| 23-Helzer PS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -associated with “hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior” & “deep link” between physical purity and moral judgment (p. 517). -associated with disgust that figures in judgments of sexual moral violations (p. 521). | |